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I. INTRODUCTION
Decision-making is difficult in a complicated world. As the number
of considerations involved in making a decision increases, it becomes
harder and harder to gather all the information needed to make an
informed choice. Proliferating considerations also introduce uncertainty
as to how different factors should be weighed in making a final choice,
and complicate the process of justifying decisions to others, especially
when some of the considerations involved in the decision appear
inherently subjective. So it should not be surprising that would-be
buyers rely on consumer reports, which assemble data on a variety of
options within a product class, list them side-by-side, and assign ratings
to them. In choosing which college or law school to attend, prospective
students often turn to rankings that not only gather in one place relevant
information on comparable schools, but also tell students how relatively
important each piece of information should be in determining which
school to attend. Loan officers lean on credit ratings in choosing
whether or not to extend credit to a would-be homebuyer, and school
districts point to school funding formulas in apportioning funding for
schools.
Measures that summarize complex realities can make decisionmaking easier. We refer generally to such measures as "indicators."' If
indicators simplify decisions, though, they often do so by transferring
the "heavy lifting"-in terms of gathering information, exercising
judgment, and justifying choices made-from the point of decision to
the point at which indicators are generated. Indicators are becoming
more popular in international settings, from the U.N. Human
Development Index 2 to Moody's and Standard & Poor's sovereign
credit ratings4 to human rights indicators generated by a variety of
organizations.4 Indicators are vulnerable to a variety of criticisms-that
they are "by definition a simplification of reality," 5 that they represent a
1. Willem F.M. de Vries, Meaningful Measure: Indicators on Progress,Progress on
Indicators, 69 INT'L STAT. REV. 313, 315 (2001) (defining "statistical indicators as single
numbers ... that try to capture a more or less complex reality").
2. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP), Human Development Reports (HDR),
availableat http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/ [hereinafter UNDP].
3.

Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, Sovereign Credit Ratings, CURRENT ISSUES IN

ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, June 1995, at 1 ("In recent years, the demand for sovereign credit
ratings-the risk assessments assigned by the credit rating agencies to the obligations of central
governments-has increased dramatically.").
4. See Rajeev Malhotra & Nicolas Fasel, Quantitative Human Rights Indicators-A
Survey of Major Initiatives (Mar. 2005) (unpublished article, available at http://www.
(discussing "major
aboakademi.filinstutlimr/research/seminars/indicators/Background.doc)
attempts and approaches to develop quantitative human rights and related indicators").
5. De Vries, supranote 1, at 315.
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"widespread turn to 'accounting culture' in which tests of measurability
often prevail over accurate and contextually sensitive assessments of
substance or actions," 6 that they rely on information that "contain[s]
biases that ... can distort ratings." 7 When important decisions are made
on the basis of indicators, moreover, concerns about the "accountabilit
deficit in the growing exercise of transnational regulatory power'
suddenly apply to indicator generation, as well.
Is it possible to hope that defects in indicators, as well as the process
by which they are generated, might be remedied as indicators become
more widely used? After all, consumer products that are widely used
and subject to competition tend to become more dependable and welladapted to their intended uses; indicators may similarly become more
accurate, and the process by which they are developed marked by
greater accountability, as they are employed to make critical decisions.
In this Article, I attempt to explain how levels of accountability in the
generation of governance indicators are determined. I then reason from
this explanation to speculate about how hopeful we should be about
accountability in global administration generally.
We can postulate two means by which levels of accountability in
indicator generation are determined. The first we can name is the
Demand Hypothesis: that the users and targets of indicators demand
either accuracy or influence from indicator generators, and that the
response of generators to these demands determines observed levels of
accountability. The second might be called the Supply Hypothesis: that
indicator generators want their indicators to be used, and that they
provide higher levels of accountability in order to attract users. In this
Article, I will test how well each of these hypotheses explains observed
levels of accountability in the generation of three indicators: the
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ratings produced by the
Political Risk Services Group (PRS Group), a for-profit private
company;9 the Freedom in the World ratings generated by Freedom
House, a non-profit non-governmental organization;' 0 and the
Minorities at Risk (MAR) variables developed by the MAR Project, an
6.

AnnJanette Rosga & Margaret L. Satterthwaite, The Trust in Indicators: Measuring

Human Rights, 27 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 253, 256 (2009).

7.

Kenneth A. Bollen, PoliticalRights and PoliticalLiberties in Nations: An Evaluation

ofHuman Rights Measures, 1950 to 1984, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATISTICs 188, 201 (Thomas

B. Jabine & Richard P. Claude eds., U. of Pa. Press 1992).
8. Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 16 (Summer/Autumn 2005).
9. PRS GROUP, International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), http://www.prsgroup.
com/ICRG.aspx (last visited Sept. 24, 2010) [hereinafter PRS Int'l Country Risk Guide].
10.

FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG,

Freedom

in

the

World,

http://www.freedomhouse.org/

template.cfm?page=15 [hereinafter Freedom in the World].
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academic project at the University of Maryland." I will then consider
some of the reasons each hypothesis succeeds or fails to describe what
is observed, and conclude by consolidating the hypotheses into a single
explanatory thesis.
Part II provides an overview of governance indicators: what they are,
who generates them, how they are used, and the reasons they are
employed. Part III elaborates on some of the terminology that will be
used in this Article and addresses some preliminary concerns that must
be sorted out before an earnest discussion of accuracy and
accountability in governance indicators can be attempted. Part IV
presents the Demand Hypothesis, and explains why it seems like a
reasonable hypothesis as to how accountability in indicator generation is
determined. Part V describes the nature and uses of each of the
indicators that will be analyzed here; then, Part VI tests the Demand
Hypotheses against the test case indicators by comparing the levels of
accountability the Hypothesis would predict in each test case to the
levels actually observed. Part VII advances a set of explanations for
why the Demand Hypothesis predictions deviate from reality.
Part VIII lays out the Supply Hypothesis, offering it as an alternative
to the Demand Hypothesis that may address its shortcomings. Parts IX
and X test the Supply Hypothesis against the test case indicators, and, as
with the Demand Hypothesis, then attempt to account for any shortfall
between its predictions and reality. Finally, in Part X, I conclude by
tying the lessons of this analysis together.

II. AN

OVERVIEW OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

Governance indicators can measure an extremely diverse array of
phenomena, and are generated and used by several different types of
entities. The proximate causes of the increasing reliance on governance
indicators are relatively plain, but the deeper reasons for this shift for
quantification are less clear, thus inviting speculation. This section will
provide some factual background on governance indicators, and suggest
a few reasons for their increasing appeal in aid, investment, journalism,
and academia.
A. What Are Governance Indicators?
Put simply, governance indicators attempt to measure the quality of
governance within a country. Defining "governance" or "good
11.
2010).

MAR, The MAR Project, http://www.cidcm.umd.edulmar/ (last visited Oct. 19,
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governance" is difficult, in large part because the term is so capacious.' 2
Many definitions attempt to specify the particular components of good
governance. Thus, back in 1994, the World Bank defined "good
governance" as "epitomized by predictable, open and enlightened policy
making; a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an executive
arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law."
Marie Besangon has resorted to even greater detail:
A well governed nation provides: rule of law; political and civil
freedoms; medical and health care; schools and educational instruction;
roads, railways, the arteries of commerce; communications networks; a
money and banking system; a fiscal and institutional context within
which citizens can prosper; support for civil society; and a method of
regulating the sharing of the environmental commons. Together, the
management, supply and delivery of some or most of these goods
constitutes governance, and the extent to which nation-states do or do
not so perform can-at least in theory-be measured.14
Daniel Kaufnann et al. of the World Bank, in their widely cited
World Governance Indicators (WGIs),15 define governance by means of
six dimensions: voice and accountability, political instability and
violence, government effectiveness, regulatory burden, rule of law, and
control of corruption.16
The only problem with these definitions of good governance is that
they do not necessarily help us identify governance indicators that do
not explicitly label themselves as such. We could say that any indicator
which measures some aspect of good governance, as described above,
should be called a governance indicator-but an easier approach might
just be to note that all governance indicators tend to (1) choose some
aspect of the relationship between a government and its society, (2)
12. See, e.g., Daniel Kaufmann & Aart Kraay, On Measuring Governance: Framing
Issues for Debate 1 (World Bank Institute, Roundtable on Measuring Governance Issues Paper,
2007), available at http://info.worldbank.org/etools/acportal/docs/Kaufmann%20_Measuring
%20_Governance.pdf ("governance writ large is a concept that defies easy definition, and even
some of the commonly accepted dimensions of governance, such as democratic accountability,
government effectiveness, or rule of law, are themselves subject to definitional ambiguities.").
13. WORLD BANK, GOVERNANCE: THE WORLD BANK'S EXPERIENCE (1994).
14. Marie Besangon, Good Governance Rankings: The Art of Measurement 1 (World
Peace Foundation, WPF Report No. 36, 2003), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/
files/wpf36governance.pdf (emphasis in original).
15. STEVEN RADELET, CHALLENGING FOREIGN AID: A POuCYMAKER'S GUIDE TO THE
MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE ACCOUNT 34 (Center for Global Development 2003) (characterizing
the WGIs as "the most comprehensive and best quality database available on governance
indicators").
16. Daniel Kaufmann t al., Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicatorsfor 19962004 5 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3630, June 2005).
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identify some normative framework within which this relationship can
be judged, and (3) measure how well the actual relationship within a
country fulfills the normative framework. Consequently, governance
indicators do not explore inter-governmental relations-trade
negotiations, extradition practices, and representation at international
bodies. Likewise, they do not study purely private practices-family
life, religious organization, production, and trade-unless such spheres
are significantly influenced by government activities.
Essentially all governance indicators, then, attempt to quantify the
quality of some aspect of the relationship between a government and its
society. Some governance indicators, like those used by U.N. treaty
bodies to monitor state compliance,1 7 measure human rights protections
while others, like the indices produced by Transparency International,
assess perceived levels of corruption. Yet others, such as the Heritage
Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, measure economic freedom. 9
Because the points of interaction between a government and its society
are innumerable, governance indicators can understandably take an
endless variety of forms.
This does not mean, however, that any indicator can be a governance
indicator. Excluded from the category, for example, should be the U.N.
Human Development Index (HDI), which composes indices measuring
life expectancy, educational attainment, and adjusted GDP per capita
into a single measure meant to represent levels of human development
within a country. 20 While the HDI certainly may be correlated with
certain aspects of how a government relates to its society, the Index
does not purport to directly measure any aspect of the relationship
between a government and its society. Similarly, indicators that simply
measure economic or financial performance within a country, such as
the ICRG Economic Risk Index,21 should not really be considered
governance indicators, though government policies almost certainly
affect their levels.
17. See, e.g., Rosga & Satterthwaite, supra note 6, at 257-58 (examining how "the treaty
bodies-assisted by an expert institution charged with supporting the treaty bodies, the U.N.
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights-have begun to use indicators in their
monitoring of State compliance").
18.

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, GLOBAL CORRUPTION BAROMETER (2009), available

at http://www.transparency.org/content/download/43788/701097/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
19.

HERITAGE FOUNDATION,

2010 Index of Economic Freedom, http://www.heritage.

org/Index/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2010).
20. UNDP, supra note 2; see also de Vries, supra note 1, at 322-23 (describing method
by which HDI is calculated).
21.

PRS GROUP, INTERNATIONAL

COUNTRY RISK GUIDE METHODOLOGY 7 (2009),

available at http://www.prsgroup.com/PDFS/icrgmethodology.pdf ("[t]he overall aim of the
Economic Risk Rating is to provide a means of assessing a country's current economic strengths
and weaknesses.").
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B. Who Develops GovernanceIndicators?
Governance indicators are primarily developed by four different
kinds of entities: official aid agencies, non-government organizations
(NGOs), academics, and private companies. Examples abound of each
kind of indicator generator. Perhaps the most widely respected
governance indicators are the WGIs generated by the World Bank.2 2
The World Bank also produces internal Country Performance and
Institutional Assessments (CPIAs)-quantitative measures that guide
the allocation of development fundS23 -as well as the Business
Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS), which it
developed jointly with the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), and which "assess the constraints to private
sector growth." 24 Notably, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 25 and
African Development Bank (AfDB) 26 also follow the CPIA model.
Non-governmental organizations generate an array of governance
indicators, from the Corruption Perceptions Index and Index of
Economic Freedom produced, respectively, by Transparency
International 27 and the Heritage Foundation,2 8 to the array of
governance measures tracking competitiveness and government-civil
society cooperation generated by the World Economic Forum,29 to the
22.

WORLDWIDE

GOVERNANCE

INDICATORS

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp

PROJECT,

Governance Matters 2009,

(last visited Sept. 24, 2010); see also

RADELET, supra note 15, at 34.
23. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION,

IDA

Resource Allocation Index

(IRAI)-2008, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,con
tentMDK:21359477-menuPK:2626968-pagePK:51236175-piPK:437394~theSitePK:73154,00.
html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
24.

THE

EUROPEAN BANK

FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND

REDEVELOPMENT,

Surveys, http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/analysis/surveys.shtml
2010.

Economic

(last visited Sept. 24,

25. ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, Performance Based Allocation, http://www.adb.org/
ADF/PBA/default.asp (last visited Oct. 19, 2010); see also ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
REFINING THE PERFORMANCE-BASED ALLOCATION OF ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND RESOURCES 1

available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/ADF/PerformanceBased
(2008),
Allocation/Refining-Performance-Based-Allocation.pdf.
26.

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP, 2007 COUNTRY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT

RATINGS 2 (2008), available at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/
Project-and-Operations/30735051-EN-BANK-GROUP-CPIA-CPPR-GR-2007-DISCLOSURE.
PDF [hereinafter 2007 COUNTRY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT RATINGS].
27. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18.
28. HERITAGE FOUNDATION, supra note 19.
29. See, e.g., WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, The Africa Competitiveness Report 2009,

http://www.weforum.org/en/initiatives/gcp/Africa%20Competitiveness%20Report/index.htm
(last visited Sept. 19, 2010) (scoring economic competitiveness of African countries); WORLD
ECONOMIC

FORUM,

Global Governance Initiative Annual Report

2009,

http://www.

weforum.org/pdf/Initiatives/GGIReportO6.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2010) ("provid[ing] . . . a
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well-publicized Freedom in the World ratings released annually by
Freedom House. 30 Academics similarly are responsible for a myriad of
governance indicators, with some projects pursued by individual
academics31 and others institutionally supported by universities, such as
the University of Maryland 32 and National Taiwan University. 33
. Finally, some private companies have governance indicators that
measure political risk, such as the factors produced by Business
Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI)34 and the ICRGs generated by
PRS. The indicators produced by BERI and PRS are available only for
a price.
C. Uses of Governance Indicators
Governance indicators have three predominant uses: determining
allocations of development funding, guiding investment flows, and
supporting journalism and academic analyses. To begin with the first:
governance indicators are sometimes used to guide the allocation of
development funding among countries, or to identify a threshold which
recipient candidates must cross before they may be eligible for funding.
A number of international donors in recent years have begun to
demonstrate greater selectivity in administering their loans, based in
part on research by World Bank economists Craig Burnside, David
Dollar, and Paul Collier indicating that aid is positively correlated with
growth in countries with good policies and strong institutions, but

scorecard to measure the effort exerted by governments, international organizations, business
and civil society" toward the Millennium Development Goals).
30.

FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, supra note 10.

31. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Bollen, Issues in the Comparative Measurement of Political
Democracy, 45 AM. Soc. REV. 370 (1980) (presenting an index of political democracy);
Christopher Clague et. al., Contract-Intensive Money: ContractEnforcement, Property Rights,
and Economic Performance, 4 J. EcoN. GROwTH 185 (1999) (proxying the enforceability of
contracts and security of property rights by the ratio of non-currency money to the total money
supply).
32. MAR, supra note 11 (coding "the status and conflicts of politically-active communal
groups").
33.

ASIAN BAROMETER, Program Overview, http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/

introduction/ProgramOverview.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2010) (surveying "attitudes and
orientations toward political regime, democracy, governance, and economic reform" in East
Asia).
34.

BUSINESs ENVIRONMENT RISK INTELLIGENCE, Business Risk Service, http://www.beri.

com/brs.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2010) (advertising risk assessment services, including a
Political Risk Index).
35. PRS GROUP, supra note 21, at 2 ("[t]he aim of the political risk rating is to provide a
means of assessing the political stability of the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable
basis.").
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exhibits little correlation in countries with poor policies and weak
*36
institutions.
Thus, as already mentioned, the World Bank's International
Development Association (IDA) has implemented a Performance-Based
Allocation system that steers funds toward countries that demonstrate
better "performance in implementing policies that promote economic
growth and poverty reduction,"37 as reflected in the internally developed
38
Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) ratings.
Developed internally, and until recently unavailable to the public, the
CPIAs assess countries' (a) economic management, (b) structural
policies, (c) policies for social inclusion and equity, and (d) public
sector management and institutions, thereby determining how IDA
resources will be allocated among countries.39 The ADB introduced a
system for Performance-Based Allocation in 2001 that uses the same
performance criteria as the IDA to distribute aid, though potential aid
recipients are rated according to these criteria by the ADB itself, not the
IDA. 4 0 The AfDB implemented a similar system, likewise featuring
internal assessments, in 1999.41
As for the threshold approach, the main example to date of
development agencies using governance indicators to set up thresholds
for recipient eligibility is the Millennium Challenge Corporation
(MCC), which was established in January 200442 and signed its first

36.

Steven V. Hook, Ideas and Change in U.S. Foreign Aid: Inventing the Millennium

Challenge Corporation,4 FOREIGN POL'Y ANALYSIS 147, 157-58 (2008) (pointing to studies by

Craig Burnside & David Dollar, Aid, Policies, and Growth, 90 AM. EcoN. REV. 847 (2000), and
Paul Collier & David Dollar, Aid Allocation and Poverty Reduction, 45 EUR. EcoN. REV. 1
(2002) as instrumental in shifting American foreign assistance toward an emphasis on good
governance, thereby enabling the creation of the MCC).
37. International Development Association, How IDA Resources Are Allocated 2010,
http://web.worldbankorg/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/IDA/0,,contentMDK:20052347~
menuPK:2607525-pagePK:51236175-piPK:437394-theSitePK:73154,00.html (last visited Sept. 13,
2010).
38.

See,

e.g.,

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

ASSOCIATION,

COUNTRY

POLICY AND

INSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENTS: 2008 ASSESSMENT QUESTIONNAIRE 2-3 (2008), available at

http://siteresources.worldbank.org/IDA/Resources/73153-1181752621336/CPIA2008question
naire.pdf (describing the CPIA assessment process and criteria).
39. Id.
40.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, REVIEw OF THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK'S POLICY ON

THE PERFORMANCE-BASED

ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES

1, 22-24 (2004),

available at

http://www.adb.org/Documents/Policies/ADF/PerformanceBasedAllocation/performance-bas
ed-allocation.pdf.
41.
42.

2007 COUNTRY PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT RATINGS, supranote 26, at 2-3.
http://www.mcc.
MCC,
About
CORPORATION,
CHALLENGE
MILLENNIUM

gov/mcc/about/index.shtml (last visited Sept. 13, 2010) [hereinafter About MCC].
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compact in April 2005.43 While there are few other overt examples of
aid agencies using threshold or "challenge" funding, the MCC's
approach has the potential, depending on its eventual success, to exert
great influence in the development world."
The MCC identifies candidates for assistance based on the
requirement that per-capita income levels fall beneath certain thresholds
set by the World Bank,4 5 and then selects countries eligible for
assistance with reference to 17 indicators developed by third parties that
are grouped into three broad categories: Ruling Justly, Investing in
People, and Economic Freedom. 46 A country must perform above the
median in its income peer group-countries are sorted into Low Income
and Lower Middle Income groups-on at least half the indicators in
each of the three policy categories, and above the median on the Control
of Corruption indicators found in the Ruling Justly category, in order to
become eligible for assistance. 47 As of January 2010, the MCC had
approved $6.9 billion in compacts with 19 countries.4 8
The MCC's uniqueness, and hence its high profile, stems from three
factors that distinguish it from the other multilateral schemes:4 9 first, its
indicators determine absolute eligibility for funding, rather than simply
adjusting allocations among recipients; second, its indicators are
developed by third parties on the basis of publicly available data, as
opposed to being created by agency staff on the basis of confidential
determinations; and third, significant amounts of funding are involved,
ranging from the $60 million compact signed with Vanuatu in 200650 to
43.

MILLENNIUM

CHALLENGE

Madagascar, US. Sign

CORPORATION,

Millennium

Challenge Aid Compact (Apr. 18, 2005), available at http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2005/April/20050418192454liameruollennoccm0.5341761.html.
44. See, e.g., Steven Radelet, Pushing Not Pulling Reforms: Delivering Aid through
Challenge Grants,in THE NEW PUBLIC FINANCE: RESPONDING To GLOBAL CHALLENGES 510, 511

(Inge Kaul & Pedro Conceigio eds., United Nations Development Programme 2006)
(suggesting that donors are increasingly beginning to differentiate aid strategies by offering
"greater national policy ownership, more flexible and attractive aid modalities, and larger, more
predictable and longer term resource commitments" to countries that demonstrate good
governance). See also Doug Johnson & Tristan Zajonc, Can Foreign Aid Create An Incentive
for Good Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (Apr. 11, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file at http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~tzajonc/mccwp
apr06.pdf) (finding preliminary evidence that countries respond to MCC incentives by
improving their scores on indicators).
45.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION,

Step 1: Identify Candidate Countries,

http://www.mcc.gov/pages/selection (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
46.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, Selection Indicators, http://www.mcc.gov/

pages/selection/indicators (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
47.

MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, infra note 110, at 2.

48.
49.

About MCC, supra note 42.
Radelet, supra note 44, at 514.

50.

MILLENNIUM

CHALLENGE

CORPORATION,

Vanuatu,

http://www.mcc.gov/mcc/

countries/vanuatu/index.shtml (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
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the $700 million compacts signed with Morocco and Tanzania in 200751
and 2008,52 respectively. Recipients are given expansive discretion in
determining how these funds should be spent. 53
Governance indicators are also commonly used in journalism and
academia to reflect the state of governance in a country. The most
Corruption
International's
indicators-Transparency
famous
Perceptions Index, the Heritage Foundation's Economic Freedom Index,
and Freedom House's Freedom in the World ratings-are each cited
hundreds of times per year in magazines and newspapers. 54 These
citations often include references to particular countries' scores5-sO
that coverage functions as criticism or approbation of a country's
governance-or, occasionall assessments of changes in governance
within regions or worldwide. The indicators produced by development
agencies and private companies receive far less journalistic coverage.5 7
However, all three types of indicator generators commonly find their
products featured in academic publications, most commonly in
statistical analyses of how some dependent variable depends on various
aspects of governance.58
Finally, governance indicators-especially those generated by
private companies-influence private investment decisions. According
to BERI's website, "[s]ince 1966 BERI has consistently refined the
51.

MILLENNIUM

CHALLENGE

CORPORATION,

Morocco, http://www.mcc.gov/pages/

countries/overview/morocco (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
52.

MILLENNIUM

CHALLENGE

CORPORATION,

Tanzania, http://www.mcc.gov/pages/

countries/overview/tanzania (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
53. Radelet, supra note 44, at 514-15.
54. A LexisNexis search of Major Newspapers and Magazine Stories from Jan. 1, 2008 to
Dec. 31, 2008 yields 57 results for "Heritage Foundation" and "Economic Freedom," 299 results
for "Freedom House," and 447 results for "Transparency International" and "Corruption."
55. See, e.g., Call for Vietnam to Adopt Long-Term Strategies, Reforms, ASIA PULSE
NEWS, Dec. 3, 2008 (noting that Vietnam "is currently ranked 120th out of 157 countries in the
Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom"); Wife of Sudanese Islamist Leader
Accuses Sudanese Officials of Corruption, SUDAN TRIB., Dec. 31, 2008 (observing that "Sudan
has consistently named by watchdog Transparency International as one of the most corrupt
countries in Africa"); Is the PhillippinePress Free?, MANILA BULL., Oct. 29, 2008 (explaining
that Freedom House ranks the Phillippines as "Partly Free").
56. See, e.g., Gary J. Bass, Despot Watch, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008 (noting that
"Freedom House's annual report for 2007 grimly noted that there had been reversals for liberty
in one-fifth of the world's countries").
57. A LexisNexis search of Major Newspapers and Magazine Stories from Jan. 1, 2008 to
Dec. 31, 2008 produces 10 results for "International Country Risk Guide," 2 results for
"Business Environment Risk Intelligence," 1 result for "World Bank" and "World Governance
Indicators," and 0 results for "World Bank" and "Country Policy and Institutional Assessment."
58. See, e.g., Jeffrey Sachs et al., Ending Africa's Poverty Trap, 1 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
EcoN. ACTIVITY 117, 121 (2004) (exploring the statistical relationship between the
Transparency International, WGI, and ICRG governance indicators, and economic growth in
tropical sub-Saharan Africa).
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system developed by the firm to evaluate risks faced by companies with
international operations. Executives benefitting from this experience
potentially have a strategic advantage."59 This utility, the private
generators argue, leads to significant influence in the business world,
with the PRS Group's website claiming that its products are used by
"over 80% of the top companies in the world." 6 Christine Arndt and
Charles Oman agree, noting that "[d]issatisfaction with the traditional
ratings systems has greatly reinforced international investors' attention
to the quality of governance, and their demand for governance
indicators, in developing countries." 6 1 Indeed, according to Arnst and
Oman, "[i]nterviews undertaken for this study of 10 major
internationally active banks and companies confirmed . . . the strong

recent growth in such investors' predilection for using governance
indicators in their lending." 62
D. Motivationsfor the Use of Governance Indicators
1. Proximate Motivations
Arndt and Oman identify four developments that have led to an
increased interest in governance, and, consequently, greater generation
and use of governance indicators. First, the "spectacular growth of
international investment in developing countries over the last 15 years"
led to "international investors' major newfound interest in the quality of
governance in developing countries," mostly as a way of managing the
risk to which their assets were now exposed. 63 Second, the "perceived
disappearance of the Communist threat" with the end of the Cold War
liberated donors to focus more on the internal governance of their aid
recipients, rather than concentrating exclusively on their geopolitical
significance. Third, "growing perceptions . . . of a relative failure or
inadequacy of policy reforms widely undertaken in the 1980s and
1990s" led to an increased appreciation of the ways in which "strong
markets require good governance." 65 Finally, and related to the third
point, the New Institutional Economics pioneered by Douglass North
and others deepened the understanding of the ways in which institutions

59.
60.
61.

BUSINEsS ENVIRONMENT RISK INTELLIGENCE, supra note 34.
THE PRS GROUP, supra note 9.
CHRISTINE ARNDT & CHARLES OMAN, USES AND ABUSES OF GOVERNANCE INDICATORS

38 (2006), available at http://www.governance.unimaas.nl/training activities/aau/download/
Papers/Usesofabusesofgovernanceindicators%5Bl1 %5D.pdf.
62. Id. at 38.
63. Id. at 15-16.
64. Id. at 16-17.
65. Id. at 17-18.
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influence and interact with "long-term economic growth, enhancement
of human welfare and societal development." 66
2. Fundamental Motivations
If the proximate motivations identified above do explain why
governance became an increasingly prominent consideration for aid
agencies, journalists, academics, and private investors in the first decade
of the new millennium, though, they do not necessarily explain why
there was a turn to governance indicators as a means of ascertaining the
quality of governance. A detailed exploration of the sociology of
governance quantification is beyond the scope of this Article, but some
possible motivations for the move to indicators are suggested by two
seminal works of social science: Seeing Like a State, by James C.
Scott,67 and Trust in Numbers, by Theodore Porter.6 8
3. Simplification and Uniformity
Scott examines the ways in which modern state elites aspiring to
"'take in charge' the physical and human resources of the nation and
make them more productive" 69 have often sought to do so by
"rationalizing and standardizing what was a social hieroglyph into a
legible and administratively more convenient format.', 70 He identifies a
couple of reasons that such an approach has often seemed preferable.
Because such elites have often been outsiders to the communities they
have sought to understand, control, and improve, they have needed
methods of comprehending the salient characteristics of these
communities quickly and accurately. 7 ' This requires, first, a focus on
particular features of each community to the exclusion of others, so that
the elites obtain a "static and myopic," if readily comprehensible, view
of the community.72 Second, elites require the same sorts of information
from different communities, so that communities can be compared to
one another and their progress charted over time; "the same objective
standard" has to be "applied throughout . . . regardless of local

context."73 The consequence of these dual

imperatives-toward

66.

Id.

67.

See JAMES C. ScoTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE

HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED (Yale U. Press 1998).
68.

See THEODORE PORTER, TRUST IN NUMBERS: THE PURSUIT OF OBJECTIVITY IN SCIENCE

AND PUBLIC LIFE (Princeton U. Press 1995).

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

SCoTT, supra note 67, at 51.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 46.
Id. at 44.
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simplification and uniformity-is the production, for elites, of a
"systematic and synoptic" view of the communities they seek to
manage: a view that is much more useable and accessible to such
outsiders than one predicated on intricate local knowledge, which would
inevitably involve "judgments that are complex, susceptible to fraud,
and easily overtaken by events." 74
While governance indicators may not be a technology of control akin
to the other instruments of simplification that Scott discusses, their use
does seem motivated in large part by the same considerations Scott
describes. The interactions between a government and society are
obviously intensely complicated, and the most important features of
these interactions vary significantly from country to country. Yet aid
organizations, journalists, academics, and international investors are all
usually outsiders to the countries that they seek to influence, study, or
profit from, and each of these actors will often be primarily interested in
comparing these countries to one another in allocating aid, approbation,
or investment funds, or merely in seeking to develop universally
applicable models of how governments and societies interact.
Understanding and comparing these countries as outsiders, then, will
usually be greatly facilitated by simplified and uniform assessments of
these countries, making it likely that accomplishing these dual
objectives is one of the main reasons governance indicators are
employed.
4. Bolstering Credibility and Concealing Judgment
In Trust in Numbers, Porter addresses the increasing turn over the
last two centuries to quantification in science, particularly social
science, and public policy. To us, living in the first years of the twentyfirst century, the use of numbers to communicate information, test
relationships, and make decisions may seem natural and obvious, but
Porter suggests that numbers have often been employed not because
they are the most natural descriptive or decisive mode, but because they
confer the appearance of objectivity upon judgments and thus enhance
their credibility,75 especially in circumstances of high stakes and
mistrust.
Porter describes two circumstances that have given rise to
quantification that should be of particular interest to us. First: when
faced with decisions fraught with serious political consequences,
74. Id.
75. PORTER, supra note 68, at 7-8 ("[t]he appeal of numbers is especially compelling to
bureaucratic officials who lack the mandate of a popular election, or divine right. Arbitrariness
and bias are the most usual grounds upon which such officials are criticized. A decision by the
numbers has at least the appearance of being fair and impersonal.").
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technocrats (e.g., Army engineers increasingly participating in the
selection of water projects in the early twentieth century) have turned to
cost-benefit analysis in an attempt "to create a basis for mutual
accommodation in a context of suspicion and disagreement," thereby
"promot[ing] procedural regularity" and "giv[ing] public evidence of
As Porter explains, such analysis is often subject to
fairness.
"pressures to reify its terms, to deny the validity of human judpent, to
lust after the impersonality of purely mechanical objectivity."7 Second,
when knowledge communities have lacked cohesion, when they have
been bereft of "sharp borders on the outside" and "an effortless shared
understanding,, 7 8 Porter observes that they commonly have turned to
objectivity and mechanical rigor to substitute for the lack of
interpersonal understanding and trust.79
These twin aims of quantification-to efface the operation of human
judgment and overcome deficits of trust, particularly when political
stakes are high or a community lacks cohesion-seem particularly
applicable to the generation and use of governance indicators.
Especially for aid agencies, the funding decisions they make can have
serious political consequences; moreover, for such aid agencies, as well
as for journalists and academics, any normative claims about what
governance within a state should look like will be subject to heavy
contestation, given the absence of a shared global community of values.
To give their decisions the appearance of objectivity, to obscure the
exercise of judgment that underlies them and overcome tendencies
toward mistrust, it is natural for these actors to turn to quantification in
the form of indicators. Doing so increases their credibility both with
their audiences-the political overseers of aid agencies, the readers and
peers of journalists and academics, perhaps even the supervisors of
investment analysts-and the targets of their judgments and decisions:
states and their populations.
III. CONCEPTS AND CONCERNS

Already, this discussion has involved some terms that need further
specification, and the analysis to come will involve more such terms.
Moreover, some of the bases on which this analysis will rest need to be
76. Id. at 149.
77. Id. at 187.
78. Id. at 227.
79. Id. at 223 (identifying mathematics and quantification as "ways of making knowledge
more rigid, standardized, and objective," thereby going "a long way to reduce the need for
personal trust," given the relative rarity of scientific communities connected by "informal,
personal knowledge").
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elaborated upon, if not defended, so that skeptics can at least recognize
whether they will disagree with the analysis from the outset. This
section will aim to explain key concepts and address foundational
concerns regarding their use.
A. Indicator Users, Generators,and Targets
In this Article, I will refer repeatedly to indicator users, indicator
generators, and indicator targets. The reference to indicator users should
be relatively clear; I mean the aid agencies, journalists, academics,
investors, and others who use governance indicators to make decisions
or substantiate claims. By indicator generators, I mean the entities that
produce governance indicators, whether they be aid agencies,
nongovernmental organizations, academics or universities, or private
companies. By indicator targets, I have in mind those whom governance
indicators measure, that is, states and populations.
Essentially, this Article attempts to test two hypotheses about the
behavior of these three types of actors, and to explain why the
predictions of the hypotheses diverge from reality. Much of this analysis
will be predicated upon certain generalizations about the incentives of
-the users, generators, and targets of governance indicators. I will
assume, for much of the analysis, that indicator users want for their
indicators to be as accurate as possible, though when we consider the
shortcomings of the Demand Hypothesis we will investigate this
assumption in more detail. Indicator generators, it is postulated, want to
maximize their revenues (especially if they are private companies) and
influence, but to do so with as little expenditure of effort as possible.
Indicator targets are somewhat more complicated. One can readily
conceive of at least three types of actors within each targetgovernment, business, and civil society-that might have an interest in
indicator levels, and it does not appear that all of these actors will
necessarily share the same interests. Governments may want to inflate
indicator levels to receive greater inflows of development funding and
private investment; business may want to deflate indicators to
discourage foreign competition, or inflate indicators to secure additional
capital; and civil society may seek to ensure indicators are as accurate
as possible, so that oppressive governments become subject to
international opprobrium. Even these predictions are just stabs in the
dark; the actual motivations and interests of groups within country
targets may vary widely depending on the circumstances.
Do such heterogeneity and variation matter? As will be described in
the presentation of the Demand Hypothesis, actors interested in
indicator accuracy should desire enhanced accountability, since
transparency, reason-giving, review, participation, and legality allow
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them to identify flaws in the indicators, complain about these flaws, and
suggest remedies. Other actors, who are interested only in affecting the
levels of indicators without regard to their accuracy, should also want
accountability, since otherwise they will have no way of exerting the
influence they desire. Consequently, despite the heterogeneity of actors
within indicator targets, we can still presume a general desire on their
part for enhanced accountability. It is on this basis that the analysis will
proceed.
B. Accuracy
Throughout this Article, I refer to accuracy in governance
indicators-either as something sought by indicator users or by
indicator targets. The Demand Hypothesis posits that accountability
levels in the generation of govemance indicators are determined, to
some extent, by demands for accuracy on the part of users and targets of
indicators, while the Supply Hypothesis suggests that accountability is
determined by the efforts of indicator generators to demonstrate to users
that their indicators are accurate. Some may wonder, however, what
accuracy in governance indicators even means, and whether it is in fact
achievable. Skeptics may suggest that this analysis is irretrievably
flawed, given the impossibility of quantifying complex phenomena
subject to value-laden judgments.
Governance indicators cannot measure governance itself directly,
since it is an abstract concept, or a "construct." Instead, the indicators
must measure some proxy for governance, based on a hypothesis about
how this proxy relates to the construct. M.A. Thomas suggests that
whether an indicator which is meant to depict a construct "measure[s]
what [it] purport[s] to measure"80 depends on the answers to three
questions: (1) whether the construct represented by the indicator has
content validity, that is, "that researchers rigorously define what it is
they wish to measure before they set out to measure it, and that the
definition have as much in common as possible with the way the
construct is typically defined and used[;]"' (2) whether the model
linking observable variables to the construct is correctly specified; 82 and
(3) whether the "proposed measure has the same relationships with
observable variables that the theory predicts the construct itself to
have," or whether the model has construct validity. 83
80. M.A. Thomas, What Do the Worldwide Governance Indicators Measure? 12 (June
2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at http://www.sais-jhu.edu/faculty/melissa _thomas/
What%20Do%20the %20Worldwide%20Govemance%20Indicators%20Measure.pdf).
81. Id. at 18-19.
82. Id. at 19.
83. Id. at 9.
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Skeptics might contend that governance indicators can never be
"accurate" under this three-part test, because they could never pass the
first prong; governance is too multifarious, polyvalent, and contested a
notion for any single definition of governance to have content validity.
Even if this is true, though-a question certainly beyond the scope of
this Article-the fact remains that governance indicator users,
generators, and targets may all nonetheless feel that the concept is
amenable to definition, measurement, and verification, and thus may
demand accountability in order to affect perceived accuracy (in the case
of users and some targets) or the levels at which indicators are set (in
the case of some targets), or supply accountability so as to influence
perceptions of accuracy (in the case of generators). Whether any
definition of governance can actually have content validity, then, is not
really relevant to the actions of users, generators, and targets, so long as
they believe the construct is capable of definition. In fact, even doubts
on the part of these actors about the possibility of governance content
validity may not affect the analysis here, since targets that disagree with
the effort to define and measure governance should still seek
accountability under the Demand Hypothesis in order to make this
viewpoint heard, and generators will still attempt to provide
accountability under the Supply Hypothesis in order to reassure users
that their definitions are valid.
References to accuracy in governance indicators in this Article, then,
should not be taken as presumptions that governance can accurately be
measured. Rather, this Article is predicated only on the assumption that
the perception of accuracy, or the lack thereof, will motivate users,
generators, and targets to seek or supply accountability to some extent.
The goal of this Article is to understand how these efforts combine to
determine accountability levels in the generation of governance
indicators.
C. Accountability
If we are to explore the determinants of accountability in indicator
generation, we had better start with a good idea of what
"accountability" means. In their foundational paper introducing the
Global Administrative Law (GAL) Project, Benedict Kingsbury, Nico
Krisch, and Richard B. Stewart explain that accountability can be
promoted by "ensuring that [administrative bodies] meet adequate
standards of transparency, participation, reasoned decision, and legality,
and by providing effective review of the rules and decisions they
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make." 84 These instruments-transparency, participation, reason-giving,
review, and legality-are the components of institutional accountability.
Kingsbury et al. supply us with definitions of these terms, borrowed
from domestic contexts. They describe "participation" as "the right of
affected individuals to have their views and relevant information
considered before a decision is taken."85 Transparency involves "access
to information" and "exposing administrative decisions and relevant
documents to public and peer scrutiny." 86 Reason-giving requires the
furnishing of "reasons for administrative decisions, including responses
to the major arguments made by the parties or commenters."87 Review
provides "[a]n entitlement to have a decision . . . affecting one's rights

reviewed by a court or other independent tribunal."88 Finally, legality
involves ensuring that "components and agents within [an] order
perform their appointed roles and conform to the internal law of the
regime." 89 Of these definitions, only that of "review" needs to be
adjusted for the purposes of this Article; in the global administrative
setting, particularly concerning the actions of unofficial entities, we
should look for review not by a "court" or "tribunal," but by any
independent arbiter.
D. Global Administrative Law
If indicator-generating institutions could be considered global
administrative bodies, then the theoretical framework developed for the
GAL project-in particular, the conceptualization of accountability and
its components--could be put to use in this Article. More importantly,
any useful conclusions arrived at in this Article regarding how
accountability levels are determined in indicator generators could later
be examined with a view to generalizing them to other global
administrative bodies. But are indicator generators global administrative
bodies? Kingsbury et al. define
global administrative law as comprising the mechanisms,
principles, practices, and supporting social understandings that
promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global
administrative bodies, in particular by ensuring that they meet
adequate standards of transparency, participation, reasoned

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Kingsbury et al., supra note 8, at 17.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id. at 44.
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decision, and legality, and by9Providing effective review of the
rules and decisions they make.
The authors then explain that global administrative bodies include
formal
intergovernmental
regulatory
bodies,
informal
intergovernmental regulatory networks and coordination
arrangements, national regulatory bodies operating with reference
to an international intergovernmental regime, hybrid publicprivate regulatory bodies, and some private regulatory bodies
exercising transnational governance functions ... .
Indicator-generating institutions certainly seem to possess the broad
characteristics of global administrative bodies, at least in the case of
governance indicators. Through the governance indicators that they
develop, such organizations do "control or supervise [something] by
means of rules and regulations,"92 and thus act as regulatory bodies, and
they do affect matters of "particular public significance"; their standards
for assigning scores and ratings to countries both codify and establish
norms of state behavior, and the application of these standards to
countries leads to judgments by both private actors (e.g., investors) and
public actors (e.g., aid agencies) regarding the fitness of other entities
(governments, businesses, and civil society) for support.
However, applying the label "global administration" to the profitseeking activities of a private business, the advocacy efforts of an NGO,
or the research of a university project may trouble some observers. If
the PRS Group, Freedom House, and the MAR Project are global
administrative bodies, one might ask, then why not classify the New
York Times, whose reporting certainly affects the investment-procuring
and aid-receiving fortunes of many countries, as a global administrative
body--or even the Travel Channel? The answer cannot be that the PRS
Group, Freedom House, and the MAR Project, along with other
indicator generators, respect accountability requirements that most
media outlets do not, for such a condition would render nugatory one of
the main purposes of the GAL project: "to ensure legality,
as
accountability and participation in global administration,"
Kingsbury et al. put it. A response that makes more sense is not
necessarily that global administrative bodies already possess the virtues
that the GAL project attempts to imbue them with, but that such bodies
have sufficient normative and practical influence that demands for these
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 17.
Id.
Oxford English Dictionary, "regulate" (11th ed. Rev. 2008).
Kingsbury et al., supra note 8, at 55.
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virtues make sense. By setting themselves up as impartial arbiters of
governance and by allowing-indeed, seeking-a situation in which
their judgments act as the basis for public and private actions with
significant public repercussions, indicator-generating institutions open
themselves up to demands for greater accountability. As a consequence,
these institutions are GAL bodies, and analysis of the extent to which
they provide accountability becomes appropriate.

IV. THE DEMAND

HYPOTHESIS OF ACCOUNTABILITY

According to the Demand Hypothesis, the main types of actors who
might be moved by self-interest to demand enhanced accountability are
the users and targets of indicators. Because users make decisions based
on indicators, these decisions will be less likely to be well-advised if the
indicators are inaccurate. Users therefore should have an incentive to
push for indicators that are as accurate as possible; because increased
accountability will tend to foster improved accuracy, users should
demand enhanced levels of accountability. Because the decisions of
users will generally affect how the targets of indicators are treated, and
because these decisions will often be based to some extent on
indicators, such targets should seek greater influence over how
indicators levels are set-either to ensure improved accuracy, or just to
inflate or deflate their scores. Clearly, the best way to secure this greater
influence is through increased accountability. For both users and targets,
then, as the stakes of the decisions that depend on governance indicators
rise, their demands for increased accountability should grow in volume.
All else being equal, this should manifest in increased accountability
provision.
A. The ContributionofAccountability
Why does accountability in indicator generation make a unique
contribution to accuracy, so that users should be moved by a desire for
the latter to demand the former? Each of the GAL components of
accountability makes a unique contribution to indicator accuracy.
Transparency, or allowing access to information and enabling public
scrutiny of decisions, fosters accuracy in indicators by giving interested
parties the opportunity to complement their understanding of outcomeoriented deficiencies-indicators failing to accurately depict realitywith procedural deficiencies: indicators being developed through flawed
processes. Even if a party interested in improving indicator accuracy is
convinced that the indicator is attempting to measure badly a
phenomenon that is understood identically by all, the party will be
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handicapped in communicating this deficiency to the indicator generator
if it cannot examine the generator's methodology and data to understand
why the problem is arising. Transparency allows an indicator-generator
to harness the efforts of outsiders to diagnose the causes of inaccuracy.
Participation, or the consideration of the views and information of
affected parties, allows those interested in the accuracy of indicators to
share methodologies and data with indicator generators that they might
otherwise neglect. Outsiders may also have suggestions about how to
remedy given sources of inaccuracy that do not occur to those inside the
organization. Participation thus allows an indicator generator to access
the information and ideas of outsiders in an effort to devise treatments
for inaccuracy.
Participation does not need to be accompanied by transparency for it
to foster accuracy in indicators; even if affected parties do not know
how indicators are currently being developed, they can still share useful
information and approaches with indicator-creating institutions. But
participation is notably enhanced in effectiveness if those who
participate have full access to information about how indicators are set.
After all, participation becomes more focused and persuasive if
participants can funnel information and advice toward perceived weak
spots in an institution's procedures.
Reason-giving gives an indicator generator a preemptive opportunity
to explain why, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, any
detected inaccuracy is spurious. The requirement of reasoned decisionmaking also allows outsiders to reappraise initial judgments as to the
accuracy of an indicator, or the adequacy of indicator-generating
processes and information, by seeing how the processes are applied to
information to generate the given indicator-as well as to judge whether
decisions are actually being made on the basis of the processes and
information revealed by greater transparency. If, after examining
reasoned accounts of this application, interested parties still find the
information, processes, or indicators wanting, they can point to
deficiencies in the reasoning, or to ways in which the reasoning
indicates that processes have been poorly applied to information, in the
course of either participation in indicator development, or appeal of
certain indicators to an arbiter of some sort. Reason-giving thus allows
indicator generators to justify the levels at which indicators have been
set, to convince outsiders that processes are sound, and to use outsiders
to review decisions and processes.
This brings us to review. One can conceive of a system whereby
users and targets of indicators, despite opportunities to participate in the
creation of indicators, feel strongly that given indicators are incorrect,
or even that failures to implement suggested processes or to accept
proffered information were unjustified. The opportunity to appeal final
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decisions by an indicator generator regarding the levels at which
particular indicators should be set, or the processes or information used
in setting these levels, allows users and targets of indicators to
circumvent institutional myopia, inertia, or indifference and instead
plead their case before a disinterested arbiter. From an indicator
generator's viewpoint, more importantly, recourse to the judgment of a
third party makes it less likely that an outsider will persist in claims that
a particular decision or process was unjustified.
Legality, finally, works in tandem with the other accountability
components to ensure that their operation is actualized. Without some
assurance that individuals within a generator are actually following the
processes revealed by transparency, or carrying out the actions agreed
upon through participation, or implementing changes suggested by an
arbiter, these other components cannot make their full contribution to
improving accuracy. Likewise, outsiders must have some assurance that
other outsiders are not frustrating their efforts by taking advantage of
secret accountability processes.
B. The ProvisionofAccountability by Generators
Transparency, participation, reason-giving, review, and legality all
therefore allow an indicator generator to address inaccuracy more
effectively than it could on its own, by harnessing the efforts and
knowledge of outsiders to diagnose the sources of inaccuracy, enlarge
pools of information and methodologies, and review decision-making.
Moreover, by giving outsiders institutionalized methods of getting
involved in indicator generation, these accountability components allow
generators to control demands for accuracy and to prevent the pitch of
these demands from escalating. Reason-giving and review also help to
defuse demands for accuracy by justifying the decisions generators have
made and by conferring upon these decisions the imprimatur of fairness.
If indicator generators choose to respond to demands for accuracy, then,
they can do so most effectively and efficiently by ramping up
accountability.
The Demand Hypothesis predicts, then, that as the decisions based
on indicators involve progressively higher stakes, the intensity of
demands by users for accuracy (and possibly accountability), and by
targets for accountability, should increase. All else being equal, this
should result in greater levels of accountability provision by indicator
generators.
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C. Method ofEvaluatingthe Hypothesis
How does one test this Hypothesis? The method of this Article will
be to select three test governance indicators, chosen to represent some
variety in the nature of the indicator generator and the predominant
users of the indicator. After examining the nature of these users and the
types of decisions made based upon the indicators, I will hazard
predictions as to how much accountability, under this Hypothesis,
should be provided by each indicator generator. These predicted levels
of accountability will then be compared to the observed levels, and
discrepancies noted. A reexamination of the circumstances and
incentives facing the indicator users, generators, and targets will then
follow, with the aim of explaining why the reality deviates from the
predictions when it does so.
This analysis will largely focus on accountability "on the books"on the amounts of transparency, participation, review, and reason-giving
suggested revealed by publicly available documentation of each
indicator. Legality will be considered only where there is some reason
to believe a generator is not following its own publicly declared
processes. While this approach fails to take into account informal
to
responses
spontaneous
accountability-non-proceduralized,
information requests, attempts to participate, and complaints about
indicator levels-there is a reason for doing so. Aside from the
difficulty of actually observing such informal accountability, a good
argument can be made that such accountability is less effective than
formal, proceduralized accountability, because it depends on outsiders
taking the initiative to seek and generate accountability where there
appears to be none. It seems fair to the generators, then, to assume that
the information available on their websites and in their documentation
accurately represents the accountability levels that they furnish.
V. THREE TEST CASES
This Article will take as test cases for its hypotheses three indicators,
all of which relate to governance and each of which occupies a different
subregion of this field. I will look at (1) the ICRGs developed by the
PRS Group, a for-profit business; (2) the Freedom in the World
rankings produced by Freedom House, a non-profit NGO; and (3) the
MAR indicators developed by the Center for International Development
and Conflict Management at the University of Maryland. In this section,
I will describe the main features of each indicator-generating institution
and the users and targets of each indicator; in Part VI, I will evaluate
how well these test cases conform to the predictions of the Demand

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

25

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

426

[Vol. 22

Hypothesis.
A. InternationalCountry Risk Guides, PRS Group
1. Institutional Background
The PRS Group is a for-profit company that has been headquartered
in Syracuse, New York since its founding in 1979.94 The Group's
business largely revolves around two products: PRS ratings, and
ICRGs.9 5 Both the PRS and the ICRGs are country risk ratings, but only
the ICRGs explicitly measure the present state of governance in the
countries analyzed. 9
In 2008, ICRG produced risk ratings for 140 "countries important to
international business."9 7 ICRG country risk ratings assess the degree of
risk associated with each of 22 political, financial, or economic risk
components before aggregating the components "to provide a risk rating
for each risk category" and an "overall, or composite, risk rating." 98 The
political risk rating is composed of 12 components, each of which
measures a different aspect of political risk and is capped at a different
maximum level that varies between indicators; some components are
further broken down into subcomponents, each of which is assessed
individually.9 9 The components, when added, sum to a maximum of 100
points, and countries are classified as "Very High Risk," "High Risk,"
"Moderate Risk," "Low Risk," and "Very Low Risk" based on this
score.100

94. PRS GROUP, About Us, http://www.prsgroup.com/AboutUsOverview.aspx (last
visited Aug. 26, 2010).
95. Id.
96. PRS GROUP, PRS Methodology, https://www.prsgroup.com/PRSMethodology. aspx
(last visited Aug. 26, 2010) (PRS country reports assess "[t]welve factors . .. from an 18-month
forecast perspective," and "[flour additional factors . . . from a five-year forecast perspective,"
establishing "likely changes in the level of political turmoil and 11 types of government
intervention that affect the business climate"--implying that, strictly speaking, the PRS reports
assess future, not present, governance).
97. PRS Int'l Country Risk Guide, supra note 9.
98. PRS GROUP, ICRG Methodology, https://www.prsgroup.com/ICRGMethodology.
aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2010).
99. PRS GROUP, supra note 21, at 3-7 (For example, government stability, described as
"the government's ability to carry out its declared program(s), and its ability to stay in office," is
specified to derive from a combination of government unity, legislative strength, and popular
support; each subcomponent has a maximum of 4 points, meaning that government stability as a
whole is capped at 12 points). Id. at 3.
100. Id. at 7.
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2. Users and Targets
The PRS Group declares that the ICRG ratings are "[u]sed by
institutional investors, banks, multinational corporations, importers,
exporters, foreign exchange traders, shipping concerns, and a multitude
of others,"' 0 ' including "over 80% of the top companies in the world (as
ranked by Fortune)." 02 This suggests that the ICRGs have some
influence on investment flows that may be large in magnitude.
The PRS Group also offers "sizable discounts on its business
products . . . especially for academic use."' 0 3 A substantial collection of
academics has apparently taken the PRS Group up on this offer, using
ICRG ratings as measures of political risk, governance, and corruption
in a wide range of papers. Thus, the ICRG ratings have been used to
analyze the impact on growth of secure property rights and contract
enforcement 104 the relationship between corruption and public
investment,1bs and the effects of aid flows on the quality of
governance,106 to name just a few examples.
Finally, the ICRG ratings are incorporated into other composite
governance indexes, the most prominent of which is probably the
annually updated WGIs developed by Kaufmann et al. Kaufmann et al.
have developed six governance indicators-measuring voice and
accountability, political stability and absence of violence, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of
corruption-by aggregating 340 individual variables drawn from 35
different sources produced by 32 organizations.' 0 7 The ICRG's political
risk ratings play a very important role in these indicators, with at least
one ICRG political risk component playing a role in every WGI and 10
of the 12 components included overall. 0 8 The WGIs are widely

101. Id. at 1.
102. PRS GROUP, FAQ, http://www.prsgroup.com/FAQ.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2010).
103. PRS GROUP, Academic Titles, https://www.prsgroup.com/academictitles.aspx (last
visited Sept. 19, 2010).
104. Christopher Clague et al., Institutions and Economic Performance: Property Rights
and Contract Enforcement, in INSTrrUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: GROWTH AND
GOVERNANCE IN LESS-DEVELOPED AND POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIEs 67 (Christopher Clague ed.,

Johns Hopkins U. Press 1997).
105. Vito Tanzi & Hamid Davoodi, Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth, in THE
WELFARE STATE, PUBLIC INVESTMENT AND GROWTH 41 (Hirofumi Shibata & Toshihiro Ihori

eds., Springer 1998).
106. Stephen Knack, Aid Dependence and the Quality of Governance: Cross-Country
Empirical Tests, 68 S. ECON. J. 310 (2001).
107. Daniel Kaufmann et al., Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual
GovernanceIndicators 1996-2007 1, 8 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4654,
June 2008), availableat http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstractid=1 148386.
108. Id. at 72-78 (only religious tensions and socioeconomic conditions are excluded).
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respected and influential.109 Perhaps most notably, the MCC uses
several World Bank indicators as selection criteria to determine which
countries will receive its development grants.n10 Five of the MCC's 17
criteria are derived from the PRS Group's ICRG ratings by way of the
World Bank's WGIs" '-including the Control of Corruption indicator,
good marks on which is a sine qua non for MCC eligibility.112

The ICRGs' targets are the 140 "countries important to international
business" for which political risk ratings are published by the PRS
Group. 113 Naturally, the political risk ratings evaluate the performance
of national governments, but because the ICRGs are used by investors
and development agencies to guide investment and disbursement
decisions, the business interests and, indeed, people of these countries
are also affected by the levels at which the ICRGs are set, and should be
considered targets, as well.
B. Freedom in the World Ratings, Freedom House
1. Institutional Background
Freedom House is a non-profit NGO that was founded in 1941, with
the encouragement of Franklin D. Roosevelt, to bolster U.S. popular
support for involvement in World War 11.114 The organization is
headquartered in Washington, D.C., but maintains offices around the
world."s In 1972, Freedom House began to publish an annual survey of
global political rights and civil liberties: its Freedom in the World
rankings." 6 This publication rates "every country in the world on a
series of indicators basic to freedom," aiming to provide "a comparative
view of the global state of freedom."" Freedom House asserts that its
"rigorous research methodology has earned the organization a
reputation as the leading source of information on the state of freedom
109. See, e.g., RADELET, supra note 15, at 34 ("the most comprehensive and best-quality
database available on governance indicators"); ARNDT & OMAN, supra note 61, at 49 ("probably
the most carefully constructed and widely used indicators").
110. MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION, GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS AND THE
SELECTION PROCESS 3-4 (2009), available at http://www.mcc.gov/documents/mcc-fy-09guidetotheindicators.pdf [hereinafter GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS].

111.

Kaufmann et al., supra note 107, at 72-78.

112.

GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS, supra note 110, at 2.

113.

PRS Int'l Country Risk Guide, supra note 9.

114.

FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, Freedom House: A History, http://freedomhouse.org/template.

cfm?page=249 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
115. FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, Staff Directory, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfiu?
page--9 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010).
116. Freedom in the World, supra note 10.
117. FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, supra note 114.
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worldwide."" 8
Freedom House assigns countries numerical ratings between 1 and 7
for each of two dimensions, political rights and civil liberties, with 1
representing the most freedom and 7 the least.11 9 In 2009, Freedom
House produced political rights and civil liberties ratings for 193
countries and 16 territories.
2. Users and Targets
Freedom House avers that its Freedom in the World ratings are used
by "policymakers, the media, international corporations, civic activists,
and human rights defenders to monitor trends in democracy and track
improvements and setbacks in freedom." 120 The ratings certainly appear
frequently in the media to support claims about the state of freedom
within countries, or to support regional or global generalizations about
democratic development. A LexisNexis search of major newspapers and
magazines during 2008 yields more than 300 articles referencing
Freedom House. 1 A similar search nets fewer than 10 articles
mentioning the PRS Group's ICRGs.122
Like the ICRG ratings, the Freedom in the World ratings are also
popular with academics, with papers treating the ratings as proxies for
freedom, governance, or democracy, and using them to investigate such
phenomena as the effect of democracy on health,123 the relationship
between governance and the efficacy of government projects,124 and the
causal interplay between economic freedom, political freedom, and
economic growth.125 More often than the ICRG ratings, moreover, the
Freedom House indicators are used not just as elements in a regression,
but to summarize worldwide or regional changes in freedom, much as
the ratings are used in newspapers and magazines.126
118. FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG, Frequently Asked Questions: What is Freedom House?,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfn?page=265#1 (last visited Sept. 27, 2010).
119.

FREEDOMHOUSE.ORG,

Freedom in

the

World:

2009

Edition, Introduction,

http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfn?page=351&ana_page=352&year-2009 (last visited
Sept. 26, 2010).
120. Freedom in the World, supra note 10.
121. See supra notes 43-45.
122. See supra note 46.
123. Alvaro Franco et al., Effect of Democracy on Health: Ecological Study, 329 BRIT.
MED. J. 1421 (2004).

124. Jonathan Isham et al., Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the Performance of
Government Projects, 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REv. 219 (1997).
125.

W. Ken Farr et al., Economic Freedom, Political Freedom, and Economic Well-

Being: A CausalityAnalysis, 18 CATO J. 247 (1998).
126. See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec.
1997, at 22, 23-24 (observing that according to Freedom House's Freedom in the World survey,
"half of the 'democratizing' countries in the world today are illiberal democracies"); Larry
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Finally, the Freedom in the World ratings are also used by the
Millennium Challenge Corporation as a selection criterion for the
disbursement of funds to developing countries, with two of the
seventeen MCC threshold indicators furnished directly by Freedom
House's political rights and civil liberties ratings.1 27 The World Bank
WGIs, which incorporate the ICRGs, play a prominent role in
determining MCC eligibility, providing five of the twenty-two criteria
and the one criterion, Control of Corruption, which every candidate
must fulfill to be eligible for funding.128 But Freedom House's
indicators arguably play a more critical role in MCC selectivity than any
of the indicators incorporated into the WGIs. First, Freedom House's
ratings act as stand-alone threshold indicators; unlike the measures
included in the WGIs, they are not aggregated with other measures
before playing a role in selecting MCC recipients.1 29 Second, the
quantized nature of the Freedom House ratings increases the stakes
riding on how they are assigned. As Steven Radelet explains, "there are
only seven possible scores" on the Freedom House indicators, and
"[s]ince many countries are assigned exactly the same score (e.g., a 4 or
5), they are bunched together around the median score, which is where
the [MCC] draws the line between passing or failing."' 3 0 As a result,
small variations in Freedom House's indicators are likely to have large
effects on candidate country eligibility.
C. Minorities at Risk Dataset,MAR Project
1. Institutional Background
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project was founded in 1986 by Ted
Robert Gurr, then a professor at the University of Colorado,'' and
moved to the University of Maryland along with Gurr in 1988, where it
has since been housed in the university's Center for International
Development and Conflict Management.32 According to its website,
the project "tracks 283 politically-active ethnic groups throughout the
world from 1945 to the present-identifying where they are, what they
Diamond, Thinking About Hybrid Regimes, J. DEMOCRACY, Apr. 2002, at 21, 26 (corroborating
a "steady overall rise in freedom in the world" by noting that "the average score on the
combined seven-point Freedom House scale improv[ed] from 4.47 in 1974 to 3.47 in 2001").
127. GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS, supra note 110, at 2-4.
128. Id. at 8-21, 26-28.
129. Id. at 3.
130. RADELET, supra note 15, at 36.
131. University of Maryland, Ted Robert Gurr, http://www.bsos.umd.edulgvpt/gurr/ (last
visited Oct. 20, 2010).
132. MAR, About MAR, http://www.cidcm.umd.edulmar/about.asp (last visited Oct. 20,
2010).
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do, and what happens to them."1 33
MAR data includes both qualitative and quantitative components.
The qualitative data comprises a "risk assessment" as to "whether the
group is at risk of rebellion, protest, or repression" and a "brief history
of the group and its relations with the state[;]"l 3 4 the quantitative data is
composed of approximately 400 variables, including seventy-one
identified as "'core' variables,"' 3 5 that code characteristics ranging from
"Government repression of group"' 3 6 to "Group organization and
representation"' 3 to "Group concentration."l38
The qualitative risk assessment, while "indicator-like" in its
assignment of a level of risk to each relevant ethnic group in a given
state, is nonetheless better viewed as a non-indicator-no standardized
assessment is made of the risk of rebellion, protest, or repression in each
situation, but rather all three types of risk are discussed together in a
verbose, descriptive manner that does not lend itself to conversion into
quantized risk levels.1 39 The quantitative data, on the other hand, takes
complex phenomena and reduces them to numbers, and therefore can
appropriately be viewed as a set of indicators.1 40
2. Users and Targets
The MAR Project states explicitly that it is "designed to provide
information in a standardized format that will aid comparative research
and contribute to the understanding and peaceful accommodation of
conflicts involving communal groups," and to that end, the Project
makes its materials available to "researchers, students, public officials,
journalists, activists, and other interested officials."' 4 However, the
133. Id.
134. MAR, Data, http://www.cidem.umd.edu/mar/data.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2010)
[hereinafter MAR, Data].
135.

available

MINORITIES AT RISK, MINORITIES AT RISK (MAR) CODEBOOK 2-3 (Feb. 2009),

at

http://www.cidcm.umd.edulmar/data/mar-codebookFeb09.pdf

[hereinafter

MINORITIES AT RISK].

136. Id. at 23.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 7.
139. See, e.g., MAR, Data, Assessment for Hazaras in Afghanistan, http://www.cidcm.
umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupld=70001 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (noting that "[t]he
likelihood of Hazara protest is moderate," though "[t]hey are unlikely to rebel in the future);
MAR, Data, Assessment for Mohajirs in Pakistan, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.
asp?groupld=77007 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (explaining that "Mohajirs [sic] risk for
rebellion is moderate," and that "Mohajirs have a history of persistent protest").
140.

See MINORITIES AT RISK, supra note 135, at 1, 6-24 (describing the variables as

"quantitative indicators").
141.

CHRISTIAN DAVENPORT, MINORITIES AT RISK, DATASET USERS' MANUAL 5 (2003),

availableat http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/margene/mar-codebook_040903.pdf
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most common use of the dataset of quantitative indicators appears to be
academic. A tool on the MAR website that searches for publications
making use of the dataset between 1993 and 2010 retrieves seventy-one
publications between those years,' 4 2 while a 2004 paper by Joanne
Manrique finds eighty-five articles referring to the dataset. 43 These
studies sometimes use the MAR data merely to trace the extent of
ethnopolitical strife or freedom around the world, but in the larger
majority of cases, MAR variables are "operationalized" to enable
analysis of the relationship between such variables and other
phenomena; Manrique finds the most commonly operationalized
variables to be protest and rebellion.
In contrast, despite the fact that journalists are an intended audience
of the MAR project, journalistic uses for the indicator set seems to be
quite limited. A LexisNexis search of major newspapers and magazines
from 2008 yields not one non-academic article referring to the
Project.145 The advocacy and public policy uses of the dataset appear
similarly restricted. The paucity of journalistic mentions of the project
indicates that NGOs are probably not using its data to publicize
practices in their own countries, and that states are not employing its
data to place public pressure on other states that treat minorities badly.
Indeed, outside of academic articles and MAR's own website and
associated sites, the dataset has little online presence.146 It is certainly
possible, of course, that activists and public officials are using the MAR
indicators to identify problem areas and focus resources and attention
on those areas without referring to the indicators publicly. MAR's
website does state that "[miany are interested in identifying the most
threatened and mobilized Minorities at Risk groups," and consequently
offers easily comprehensible maps highlighting "those groups in our
database that are engaged in the most mobilization and those that are
subject to the highest forms of discrimination and repression for the
2003 time period." 4 7 Nonetheless, the most prevalent use of the MAR
142. MAR, Resources, Publications, http://www.cidcm.umd.edulmar/publications.asp (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010).
143. Joanne Manrique, Uses of the Minorities at Risk (MR) Variables 3 (Mar. 2004),
availableat http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p72457-index.html.
144. Id.
145. A LexisNexis search of Major Newspapers and Magazine Stories from Jan. 1, 2008 to
Dec. 31, 2008 produces only four results for "Minorities at Risk" and ("Gurr" OR "Maryland"
OR "CIDCM").
146. But see, e.g., www.ecoi.net, Iran, Human Rights Issues, Turkmen, http://www.ecoi.net/
189469::iran/328787.321470.8956...mr.321539/turkmen.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (quoting
MAR assessments with the aim of providing "country of origin information" to "asylum lawyers,
refugee counsels and persons deciding on claims for asylum and other forms of intemational
protection").
147. MAR, Hot Spots, http://www.cidcm.umd.edulmar/hotspots.asp (last visited Oct. 19,
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indicators seems to be academic.

VI. EVALUATING THE DEMAND

HYPOTHESIS

What levels of accountability would we predict from our three test
indicators under the Demand Hypothesis? If the provision of
accountability by indicator generators depends on the intensity of
demands for accountability by users and targets of indicators, and if
targets and users are likely to make stronger demands if the decisions
that they make based on indicators involve higher stakes, we should be
able to discern a relationship between the stakes of the decisions made
and the accountability observed. This section will explore whether such
a relationship is observed.
A. Predictionsof the DemandHypothesis
If the Demand Hypothesis is valid, we should expect the ICRGs to
display the highest level of accountability, the Freedom in the World
rankings somewhat lower levels, and the Minority at Risk variables the
lowest levels. After all, the ICRGs are used to determine investment
flows, MCC development funding allocations, and academic analyses.
Private investment flows are large in magnitude, even for developing
countries; as a World Bank report observed in 2005, "in the 1970s bank
lending was nearly 20 times the bond issues for emergin markets, but
MCC grants
by the 1990s bond issues had surpassed bank lending."
academic
Admittedly,
can amount to hundreds of millions of dollars.
analyses incorporating the ICRGs involve lower stakes, because they
tend to use the Risk Guides to study relationships between governance
and other phenomena, rather than to identify governance deficits in
particular countries. But the overall stakes involved in decisions based
on the ICRGs are certainly high.
The Freedom House rankings apparently play little role in directing
investment flows, but they are a critical component of the MCC criteria
for allocating funding, and their prominence in journalistic reporting on
trends in freedom is notable. Because the reputation of countries can be
significantly affected by how they are covered in the media, and
because this can affect political influence, prestige within the
community of world leaders, and even investment flows (if only
indirectly), the stakes involved in the use of the Freedom House ratings
2010).
148.

Facundo Martin et al., The World Bank Group, The Demand for Loans I (PUBLIC
Apr. 2005), availableat http://rru.worldbank.org/documents/
publicpolicyjoumal/289martin.pdf.
POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
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are significant, if not so high as those involved in decisions made based
on the ICRGs. The MAR variables, on the other hand, incorporated as
they are almost exclusively into scholarship, cannot be considered to
affect high-stakes decisions.
B. IndicatorMethodologies and Observed Levels ofAccountability
1. International Country Risk Guides
To test our prediction, we must carefully investigate the
methodologies employed in generating our test case indicators,
beginning with the ICRGs. The political risk ratings in the ICRGs are
subdivided into components and subcomponents; a country is assigned a
value for each component or subcomponent by an ICRG analyst, with
higher values corresponding to lower risk. 14 These assessments are
based wholly on the subjective judgment of analysts; as ICRG
documentation explains, "the ICRG staff collects political information"
and "political risk assessments are made on the basis of subjective
analysis" of this information, though "[t]o ensure consistency, both
between countries and over time, points are assigned by ICRG editors
on the basis of a series of pre-set questions.' 5 0 The points assigned to
each component are then added to yield an aggregate score and a
political risk assessment.
ICRG documentation does not describe any systematic provision that
has been made for consultation in this process; there is no participatory
"step" in the process.' 5 1 The PRS Group website does provide contact
information that groups wishing to provide input might avail themselves
of, but the information pertains to sales contacts; the editorial board,
while listed, has no accompanying contact information. 52 There
appears to be no provision for third-party review of disputed ratings.
The PRS Group publishes relatively detailed documentation describing
how its ICRG ratings are calculated, specifying the components of the
political risk rating, their weights, and the questions used to assign
scores.15 3 The Group's provision of the names of the members of its
editorial board further bolsters its transparency (though biographies do
not accompany these names). But the Group fails make public the

149. The PRS Group, supra note 21, at 3-7.
150. The PRS Group, supra note 21, at 2.
151. Id. at 2-3 (describing the process whereby ICRG ratings generally, and political risk
ratings in particular, are determined, and omitting descriptions of any participatory steps).
152. The PRS Group, Contact Us, http://www.prsgroup.com/ContactUs. aspx (last visited
Oct. 19, 2010).
153. The PRS Group, supra note 98
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sources of information that it draws on to make its assessments, 154 and
does not even explain how these sources of information are chosen, or
whether safeguards have been instituted to ensure that its information is
accurate, complete, and unbiased. The Group also does not make public
the names and qualifications of the staff analysts who do most of the
work in calculating ratings.
The PRS Group accompanies its ratings with descriptive "analyses
of events that affect the risk ratings," which could be considered to be
an exercise in reason-giving-but the Group supplies such analyses
only for 20-25 important countries, out of the 140 total countries
rated.' 5 5 The Group does "provide[] not only the risk ratings for the
countries it covers, but also the political information and financial and
economic data on which those ratings are based" in order to make it
"possible for the user to check through the information and data so as to
assess the ratings given against his or her own assessments or against
some other risk rating system" 56; such information could be considered
to be either a terse example of reason-giving or an additional source of
transparency.
2. Freedom in the World Rankings
Freedom House's ratings are developed using the services of forty
in-house and consultant analysts and seventeen "senior-level" academic
Each country or territory is first assigned to an analyst who
advisers.
is responsible for writing a report describing the situation within each
In this
country or territory and for calculating preliminary ratings.
of
diagnostic
a
series
answer
analysts
generation,
of
ratings
first step
questions under the umbrella of either "political rights" or "civil
The political
liberties" and assign point values to each response.'
rights rating is based on a checklist of ten questions, each worth a
154. The PRS Group does state generally that, regarding the ICRGs, it "produces the
information and data on which the ratings for the individual risk components are determined,
together with its interpretation of that information or data." THE PRS GRouP, supra note 21, at 2.
But it is unclear whether this information includes a detailed list of the references employed in
generating the political risk ratings, and in any case, this information is not available to nonpurchasers of the ICRGs.
155. Id.
156.

THE PRS GRoup, supra note 21, at 16.

157. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 2009 Edition, Methodology, http://www.
freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana page=354&year-2009 (last visited Oct. 19,
2010) [hereinafter FreedomHouse.org, Methodology].
158. Id.
159. Freedom House, Freedom in the World: 2009 Edition, Checklist Questions and
Guidelines, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfmn?page=351&ana_page=355&year-2009
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter FreedomHouse.org, Checklist].
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maximum of four points, and two additional "discretionary" questions
that can add or subtract points from a country's aggregate raw score; the
civil liberties rating is based on fifteen questions that are each worth
four points.16 0 Freedom House has developed a set of sub-questions to
guide the inquiry set up by each diagnostic question,161 though an
analyst is not expected to consider every sub-question in assigning a
rating to each country.162 As Freedom House's website explains,
"analysts use[] a broad range of sources of information-including
foreign
and
domestic
news
reports,
academic
analyses,
nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, individual professional
contacts, and visits to the region-in preparing the reports" and in
answering the questions. 163
After each question has been answered and scored, analysts
aggregate these values to produce "raw scores" that correspond to
ratings. Depending on the raw scores, countries may be rated "Free,"
"Partly Free," or "Not Free."164 Questions are answered, and scores
assigned, using the points assigned in the previous edition of Freedom
in the World as a benchmark; changes in raw points are made only "if
there has been a real world development during the year that warrants a
change."l 65 Moreover, once analysts have answered the diagnostic
questions and assigned raw points to countries, Freedom House puts the
preliminary ratings that result through a multi-stage review process.
Ratings are first reviewed individually; then they are re-examined on a
comparative basis in "regional meetings" involving analysts, academic
advisors with regional expertise, and Freedom House staff; and finally,
they are scrutinized on a cross-regional basis to ensure comparability
and consistency. Any major proposed numerical shifts are subject to
intensified investigation in these reviews.1 66
The Freedom in the World methodology does not suggest that any
formal provision is made in the ratings process for participation by
outside actors, whether they are institutions making use of the ratings or
entities in the countries rated. On the other hand, the "broad range of
160. Id. Thus, for example, a country may be awarded as many as 4 points toward its total
civil liberties raw score based on the answer to the question, "Is there open and free private
discussion?"
161. The question quoted above is to be answered by reference to two sub-questions: (1)
"Are people able to engage in private discussions, particularly of a political nature (in places
including restaurants, public transportation, and their homes) without fear of harassment or
arrest by the authorities?" and (2) "Does the government employ people or groups to engage in
public surveillance and to report alleged anti-government conversations to the authorities?" Id.
162. Id.
163. FreedomHouse.org, Methodology, supra note 157.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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sources of information" used by analysts to make their determinations
does include "foreign and domestic news reports, academic analyses,
nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, individual professional
contacts, and visits to the region," the latter four of which have the
potential to produce opportunities for participation by affected actors. 167
Freedom House provides lists of staff, analysts, and academic advisers,
but contact information for these participants is unavailable,16 8 with the
Freedom House website providing onlr general phone numbers and
email addresses for each of its offices.' Moreover, while ratings pass
through several stages of review by staff and consultants working for
Freedom House, there do not appear to be institutionalized pathways for
outsiders to appeal disputed ratings.170
Freedom House publishes extensive information about all phases of
its ratings-generation process for Freedom in the World, from
enumerating the questions used to guide the assignment of raw scores'71
to describing the stages of review that initial ratings must pass
through.172 It also provides names and detailed biographies of both the

analysts and academic advisers who work on each edition of the
rankings, identifying the region to which each was assigned.173 Finally,
Freedom House makes public a list of nearly 300 publications and
broadcasts, and over 150 organizations, which it draws on to produce its
ratings, identifying them as "Selected Sources."l 74 Short of opening its
deliberations to public scrutiny, then, Freedom House does nearly
everything that could be expected to make transparent the process by
which it generates ratings.
Similarly, Freedom House provides detailed "country reports" for
every state rated in Freedom in the World.175 Each report contains an
overview, or a "brief historical background and a description of major
recent events, as well as a section summarizing the current state of

167. Id.
168. Freedom House, 2009 Edition: Survey Team, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=351&anapage=356&year-2009 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter
FreedomHouse.org, Survey Team].
169. Freedom House, Contact Us, http://www.freedomhouse.org/ template.cfim?page=14
(last visited Oct. 20, 2010); FreedomHouse.org, Staff Directory, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfin?page=9 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
170. FreedomHouse.org, Methodology, supra note 157.
171. FreedomHouse.org, Checklist, supra note 159.
172. FreedomHouse.org, Methodology, supra note 157.
173. FreedomHouse.org, Survey Team, supra note 168.
174. FreedomHouse.org, 2009 Edition: Selected Sources, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfn?page=351&anapage=353&year-2009 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
175. FreedomHouse.org, 2009 Edition: Country Reports, http://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=21&year-2009 (last visited Oct. 20, 2010).
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political rights and civil liberties." 7 6 These reports can be viewed either
as additional information meant to complement the ratings or as reasongiving exercises intended to justify the ratings.
3. Minorities at Risk Variables
MAR develops indicators only for "Minorities at Risk," or
ethnopolitical groups that (1) "collectively suffer[], or benefit[] from,
systematic discriminatory treatment vis-A-vis other groups in a society,"
and (2) "collectively mobilize[] in defense or promotion of its selfdefined interests."l 7 The project determines which such groups to track
according to a set of relatively complex criteria.' 7 8 It is unclear, from
the MAR documentation, who determines whether a group qualifies for
inclusion in the dataset, but the documentation does explicitly observe
that "the project does not make claims regarding the comprehensiveness
of the dataset. That is, there are ethnopolitical groups that meet the
above criteria and are not included in the dataset."' 9
MAR quantitative dataset includes approximately 400 variables or
indicators, grouped into five categories that are themselves further
subdivided into sub-categories. so The coding is performed primarily by
"graduate and undergraduate students who . . . undergo[] a rigorous
training period," with "all coding . .. reviewed by senior editors and by
the research director . . . ."' ' Student coders are guided in their efforts

by the labels affixed to the codes that are assigned to each variable,182
but is unclear whether coders are given access to some more detailed
definition of the variables they code, aside from their titles. Some of the
information sources relied upon are listed along with the qualitative
assessments,' 8 3 and the MAR documentation explains that "[s]elected
hard-copy source materials" are kept in the Project archives, and are
176. FreedomfiHouse.org, Methodology, supra note 157.
177. MINORITIES ATRISK, supranote 135, at 1.
178. These criteria include whether (1) "[m]embership in the group is determined
primarily by descent by both members and non-members," (2) "[m]embership in the group is
recognized and viewed as important by members and/or non-members," (3) "[m]embers share
some distinguishing cultural features," and (4) "[tlhe group has at least 100,000 members or
constitutes one percent of a country's population." Id.
179. Id. at 2.
180. Id. at 5-24.
18 1. Id. at 3.
182. For example, "Restrictions on religion" may take the values 0, 1, 2, 3, and -99, which
correspond to "No restrictions," "Activities informally restricted," "Activity somewhat
restricted," "Activity sharply restricted," and "No basis for judgment," respectively. Id. at 11.
183. See, e.g., MAR, Data, Assessment for Pashtuns in Afghanistan, http://www.cidcm.
umd.edulmar/assessment.asp?groupid=70002 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (citing reports and
articles from the International Crisis Group, New York Times, and Washington Post, among
other sources).
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available to individual researchers "by arrangement with the project
coordinator."' 84 All coding "is conducted using open-source

information."' 8 5
Nonetheless, details on the coding process found in the MAR
documentation remain essentially sketchy. The Project does not list the
students who have the actual responsibility for converting information
describing complex situations into quantitative indicators, so that it is
unclear how many such students work on each edition of the indicators,
what qualifications the students bring to the process, and whether
students specialize in particular countries or regions. Moreover, while
some review of student coding apparently occurs, the MAR
documentation is ambiguous as to whether this review is systematic and
mandatory or selective, multi-stage or single-stage, committee-based or
carried out by individual staff.1 As regards methodology especially,
then, the Project fails to provide much transparency. While it might be
considered to provide some review in the form of oversight of student
coding,' 8 7 there is certainly no review by independent, impartial arbiters
at the request of interested parties, just as in the other two cases
discussed here.
Unlike the other two indicators studied here, the Minorities at Risk
Project makes some provision for participation in the generation of its
quantitative variables. Variable values are not reviewed with outside
actors before publication, and the Project does not explicitly welcome
input about additional sources of information that could be used to
supplement the Project's own data sources,' 8 8 but MAR Project
documentation does make it clear that "[r]esearchers are encouraged to
carry out their own consistency and validity checks on indicators they
use or adapt from the MAR dataset," adding that "Project staff would
greatly appreciate being appraised of the results of such analysis."' 89
Additionally, the MAR website provides lists of project staff and
identifies members of its advisory board, accompanying this
information with email addresses to facilitate communication.1 90
Finally, the Project has reached out to users of its indicators to deal with
concerns about selection bias, convening "a workshop at the [American
Political Science Association] conference in Philadelphia in September
184. MINORITIES AT RISK, supra note 135, at 4.
185. Id. at 3.
186. Id. at 3-4.
187. Id. at 3.
188. Id. at 3-4 (describing the process of coding the quantitative indicators, but failing to
describe any process of outside review or call for additional sources).
189. Id. at 4.
190. MAR, About MAR, Project Staff, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/about.asp#staff
(last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
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2006 to bring together a group of scholars to help MAR effectively deal
with selection bias."l 91 As a result, MAR has developed a strategy that
it "aim[s] to implement over the coming years, contingent on funding,"
that will involve the "develop[ment of] new, far more inclusive criteria
to identify communal groups around the world for inclusion in the MAR
dataset" and a "reduc tion of] the number of variables coded by MAR in
future updates . . . .'12 Thus, although the MAR Project does not make
formal provision for participation in its indicator-generating process, it
does both make possible and proactively seek consultation with
academic users of the indicators.
Lastly, the Minorities at Risk Project offers "qualitative
assessments" for each ethnopolitical group analyzed that contain both a
"risk assessment" and an "analytic summary"; the risk assessment
"summarizes whether the group is at risk of rebellion, protest, or
repression," while the summar97 "gives a brief history of the group and
its relations with the state." 9 The risk assessment is usually far too
terse to justify considering it to be an exercise in reason-giving, with the
assessments occupying fewer than five sentences in most cases. 194 The
analytic summary, on the other hand, is an approximately 1000-word
description of political and historical conditions that, by noting the
values assigned to major related variables in parentheses following
relevant sentences, does serve as a brief justification for ten to fifteen of
the most salient indicators.195
C. ComparingPredictionsto Observations
Upon review of these indicator-generating methodologies, how
closely does reality adhere to the predictions made by the Demand
Hypothesis? To review, the PRS Group provides some levels of
transparency in explaining how it arrives at its ratings, if it is less
forthcoming about the analysts who produce these ratings and the
information they draw on to make their determinations. It provides little
opportunity for participation, not even making available the contact
information of its directors, and no opportunity for review, though it
does provide reasons behind some of its ratings in the form of narrative
country reports. The fact that such reports are provided only for twenty
191. MAR, MAR and Selection Bias, http://www.cidcm.umd.edulmar/announcement.asp?
announcementid=26 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010).
192. Id.
193. MAR, Data, supra note 134.
194. See, e.g., MAR, Data, Assessment for Roma in Serbia, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/
mar/assessment.asp?groupId=34506 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (offering a six-sentence Risk
Assessment).
195. See, e.g., id. (including a 929-word Analytic Summary).
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to twenty-five of the most important ICRG countries, however, limits
their value in justifying the ratings.
Freedom House is a more transparent organization than the PRS
Group, providing not only a detailed account of how its ratings are
generated, but information about what sources are used in this process
and the analysts and experts who participate in ratings development and
review. Freedom House does not provide the contact information for
these analysts and experts that might allow users and targets to
communicate with these individuals and thereby participate in the
ratings generation process, but Freedom House's information does come
from some sources-NGOs, think tanks, professional contacts, and
visits to the region-which would seem to enable outside participation
in at least the process of information gathering, if not its analysis. Other
opportunities for participation are not made available. While the
organization does work with a group of academic experts to review its
ratings in a multi-stage process, there is no internal or external review
that may be triggered by outside actors. Finally, Freedom House does
provide detailed reasons for its ratings in country reports.
The MAR Project, finally, makes impressive provision for
participation in indicator generation, soliciting input from the users of
its indicators regarding the consistency and validity of the indicators
and consulting with academics at, for example, the American Political
Science Association's annual conference in order to solicit suggestions
on eliminating selection bias. The Project also includes contact
information for MAR researchers on the Project's website, giving those
interested in offering input into the process access to channels of
communication. The Project's marks on transparency are less good; its
project documentation explains in summary fashion how its indicators
are coded, provides some explication of what each indicator precisely
means, and enumerates the sources that it uses in setting its indicators,
but details on who actually does the coding, and on the extent of
training received by coders, are absent. Enough information is given,
then, for outsiders examining the MAR indicators to begin to identify
sources of inaccuracy in the way the indicators are developed, but much
more information could be provided. Review, either internal or external,
is almost entirely absent. The Project does give reasons for a subset of
its most important indicators.
The ICRGs, then, offer moderate levels of transparency in their
generation, low levels of participation, moderate levels of reasongiving, and low levels of review. Freedom House provides high levels
of transparency, moderate levels of participation, high levels of reasongiving, and low levels of review. The MAR Project furnishes relatively
low levels of transparency, high levels of participation, moderate levels
of reason-giving, and low levels of review. It is hard to synthesize these
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component levels into unified judgments about how accountable each
indicator is in its generation. But it seems clear that the ICRGs do not
display greater accountability than the Freedom House ratings, or even
the MAR variables. The Demand Hypothesis does not, then, seem to do
a good job of explaining how indicator accountability levels are set.
D. Groundsfor Objections to Each Indicator
This Article does not aim to critique governance indicators, but it is
valuable to observe that each of the test case indicators has features
which are amenable to criticism. Doing so helps demonstrate that any
paucity of demand for accountability cannot result from the design or
implementation of these indicators already being beyond reproach.
The ICRGs and the Freedom in the World ratings are both
vulnerable to the criticism that their aggregation schemes are almost
why should
governance,
In measuring
wholly arbitrary.
"Socioeconomic Conditions" be weighted twice as heavily as
"Religious Tensions," or "Investment Profile" be given three times the
weight of "Bureaucratic Quality," as in the ICRG Political Risk Index?
Why should "Associational and Organizational Rights" be given the
same weight as "Rule of Law," as in the Freedom House Civil Liberties
rating? One answer might be that any weighting of these factors could
be subject to criticism, but that still does little to justify the weights
chosen.
A related criticism is that there is little reason to believe that the
weights chosen should be fixed from country to country. Should
"Corruption" command the same weight, as the ICRGs would have it, in
Bangladesh as it does in China or Argentina? Should the quality of the
"Electoral Process" be considered equally important in judging the
levels of governance in Iran and Myanmar, as in the Freedom in the
World Political Rights Ratings? It seems likely that some factors will be
greater determinants of governance in some countries than in others,
and the determination of how much to weight various factors for each
country is probably as important as scoring the factors in the first place.
Third, all three test indicators can be criticized for being subject to
anchoring effects. Because governance in a given country will be
difficult to compare to situations in other countries, the natural tendency
for those scoring the target countries will be to compare present
governance to past governance, and then reason from past scores to
arrive at a present score. Freedom House even formally builds this
tendency into its scoring algorithm, changing a country's score only if a
significant development within that country suggests that such a change
is necessary. But this means that initial errors in rating country
governance will continue to manifest over time, because country targets
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will not be given a "clean" score each year and past scores will likely
not be revisited.
Finally, while Freedom House states that its rankings are based on
travel to the country targets and interviews there with government
officials and NGO workers, it is less clear where the PRS Group gets its
information, and it does not appear that the MAR Project process
involves much direct contact with those living in the target countries.
Given that, as Kenneth Bollen explains in the context of political risk
indicators, only a "subset of locally reported information . . . travels

beyond a country's borders," that only a fraction of this information
"reaches the United States," and that "if the filters [that winnow this
information] are . . . selective, bias is probable,"'

9

any governance

assessment that takes place almost wholly from afar is likely to be
subject to bias.
A cursory inspection of the indicator-generating methodologies
behind the ICRGs, Freedom in the World ratings, and MAR Index, then,
suggests a variety of bases on which their accuracy could be criticized.
There are grounds for demands for enhanced accountability in indicator
generation respecting these three governance indicators; why, then, does
the Demand Hypothesis not seem to describe reality very well?
VII. EXPLAINING THE FAILURES OF THE DEMAND HYPOTHESIS

Closer analysis suggests that the Demand Hypothesis has a number
of serious flaws that both inhibit demand-making by users and targets
and prevent the conversion of these demands into enhanced
accountability provisions by generators.
A. Users: Not Stakes, But Interest
The Demand Hypothesis uses the stakes of decisions made based on
indicators to determine how likely users should be to demand improved
indicator accuracy. The implicit step that is skipped in this relationship
is that between stakes and interest; the Demand Hypothesis assumes
that when decision-making stakes are high, interest in indicator
accuracy should be high, as well. In many contexts, this would not be a
bad assumption to make, because actors will tend to scrutinize the bases
of their decisions more closely when a lot is riding on these decisions.
But in the governance indicator context there are three reasons that the
stakes-interest correlation breaks down: (1) investors and agencies are
able to engage in hedging behavior when stakes are high, (2) agencies
may not be affected by the outcomes of their decisions, and (3) users are
196.

Bollen, supra note 7, at 199.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

43

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

444

[Vol. 22

unlikely to undermine the indicators they use.
1. Hedging by Users
Even if investors and development agencies have a strong interest in
ensuring that they make high-stakes decisions based on accurate
information, both types of users can hedge against the risk that any
given source of information will be inaccurate by using multiple sources
of information. For example, Mikelle A. Calhoun contends "risk ratings
do not seem to be a significant source of information for firms and
reliance on them is limited at best"; instead, "[a]vailable information
reflects that firms evaluate country risk using methods that range from
highly complex econometric models to purely qualitative, judgmental
approaches."' 9 7 This suggests that investors may not base their
investment decisions even in large part on commercial risk ratings, but
rather may use these ratings merely to supplement their own in-house
analyses.
The MCC, for many of its criteria, relies not directly on measures of
corruption or government effectiveness produced by single institutions
like the PRS Group, but on aggregate indicators compiled by the World
Bank that combine measures from as many as twenty other sources.' 9 8
In the case of the ICRGs, then, we should not be surprised to see only
moderate levels of accountability, which suggests few demands from
users for increased accuracy or accountability; for really high-stakes
decisions, users may have diversified their risk and consequently have
less interest in ICRG accuracy.
2. Insulation from Consequences of Decisions
The hedging argument seems to apply only in part to the MCC,
though. If five of the seventeen indicators used by the MCC are
furnished by the World Bank Institute in the form of aggregate
measures, the other twelve come from single institutions. Even if some
of these indicators, like the Immunization Rates criterion provided by
the World Health Organization,' 99 are sufficiently objective that the
MCC might have fewer concerns about accuracy, the same can certainly
not be said of the Civil Liberties and Political Rights criteria taken
directly from Freedom House's Freedom in the World ratings.
In this context, though, the lack of consequences for faulty decision197.

Mikelle A. Calhoun, Seeking Meaningful Country-Risk Information: A Wealth of

Information, a Void in Understanding,in PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT 147,
154 (Torben Juul Andersen ed., CBS Press 2006).
198. GUIDE TO THE MCC INDICATORS, supra note 110, at 3-4.

199. Id.
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making by agencies like the MCC can provide another source of
decreased interest in indicator accuracy, even when decision-making
stakes are high. Oversight mechanisms do exist to ensure that the MCC
channels its funds toward countries that can effectively use them-most
notably, in the form of congressional review of MCC activities. Since
MCC budgets are set by Congress, 200 if these legislators have a strong
interest in ensuring that funds go to well-governed countries, and if they
can ascertain how efficiently funds are being allocated along these lines,
then those working for the MCC should develop a substantial interest in
ensuring that the indicators used to direct allocations accurately reflect
reality.
But neither of the conditions specified are necessarily met.
Legislators may want aid to be spent effectively, but they also likely
want aid to be used in support of American geopolitical aims, and likely
also want a certain amount of aid money to be disbursed simply to
demonstrate, to constituents and other nations, a commitment to
development. Moreover, legislators will have great difficulty directly
observing how well aid is being spent; a "lack of results" can plausibly
be attributed to so many factors other than improper allocation of aid
that legislators will have difficulty monitoring how well such funds are
distributed. Finally, the use by the MCC of externally developed
measures like the Freedom in the World ratings actually allows the
organization to scapegoat entities like Freedom House for any dearth of
results that is actually observed by legislators, allowing the Corporation
to avoid budgetary consequences. For all these reasons, the MCC, and
other development agencies that might rely on indicators to make
funding decisions, should not necessarily have a significant interest in
the accuracy of these indicators, but rather an interest in justifying
expenditures to those who exercise oversight. The two are not
necessarily equivalent.201
3. Unwillingness by Users to Undermine Indicators
Even if investors, development agencies, and academics have a
strong interest in the accuracy of the indicators on which they base their
decisions, they may nonetheless avoid making public demands for
200. See, e.g., Steven Radelet, Will the Millennium Challenge Corporation Be Diferent?,
26 WASH. Q., 183 (2003) (describing Congress's role in allocating MCA funds).
201. This should not be taken to suggest that professionals working in agencies like the
MCC are not sincerely motivated to achieve positive development results. Certainly, most of
those who enter the development field likely do so because they want to "do good." But the
discipline of consequences for poor decisions can create an interest in successful decisionmaking that sincerity may not be able to match. We should have little reason to believe that this
discipline will be present in organizations like the MCC.
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improved accuracy or accountability because such demands risk
discrediting measures to which they have linked their own reputations.
Investors, by publicizing the inadequacies of political risk services like
the PRS Group, risk alerting backers to the weakness of their own
strategies. Development agencies similarly court sanction from
legislative oversight committees and protests from candidates for aid,
and academics open themselves to the charge that their work is invalid.
While the users of ' most consumer products-cars, televisions,
software-have little disincentive to protest when such products fail to
meet expectations, the users of governance indicators should generally
seek either to lodge any criticisms of accuracy or accountability levels
in private, or not to make these criticisms at all.
We should not be surprised if these criticisms are being made in
private, and if indicator generators are actually responding by offering
special levels of transparency, participation, reason-giving, and review
to select users, again in private. Thus, a survey of Freedom House's
Board of Trustees suggests that almost half of the organization's
leadership have spent a substantial portion of their careers working for
the federal government. 202 The proportion of Freedom House staff with
significant government experience is likely even higher. This is as
should be expected for a prominent NGO analyzing freedom levels
abroad, but it also indicates that U.S. government agencies may have
means of holding Freedom House to account in its indicator generation
that are not apparent from publicly available descriptions of indicator
methodology.
Such selectively and, to some extent, secretively elevated levels of
transparency, participation, reason-giving, and review bolster
accountability to some extent, but they also undermine accountability
by reducing the legality of indicator generators. When the stated
methods by which indicators are developed are subverted by the
informal access of a few actors, the foundation on which the other
accountability components rest becomes shaky. Other actors can no
longer be certain that the indicator generator is actually relying on the
methods and information that its statements would indicate, or that their
own participation is not being frustrated by the unobservable
participation of others, or that the reasons being given for particular
decisions are not being supplied by outside interests. Legality is thus a
critical, though less conspicuous, component of accountability; if users
are able to secure higher accountability levels for themselves at the cost
of overall legality, it is not clear that accountability is, on the whole,
202. See Freedom House, Board of Trustees, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?
page=10 (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) (providing a list of the organization's trustees that links to
biographies of each; according to their biographies, of the 41 trustees listed, at least 18 have had
significant experience in government).
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bolstered.
B. Targets: Not Interest, But Capacity
The defect in the Demand Hypothesis when it comes to predicting
users' behavior, then, appears to be that even if the interests of such
actors in indicator accuracy determine the intensity of demands for
accuracy and accountability, this is nonetheless poorly proxied by the
size of the stakes involved in the decisions made by users. The
Hypothesis encounters a different defect when it attempts to predict the
behavior of targets. Even if targets have strong interests in ensuring that
indicators are accurate, or at least in seeking opportunities to influence
how indicators are set-with these interests determined by what rides
on the indicators-they may lack the capacity to influence the behavior
of indicator generators or users. At least three reasons for this incapacity
can be identified: (1) targets often lack the credibility or means needed
to make persuasive demands; (2) the inability to marshal a credible
threat of exit from the indicator-target relationship undermines the
weight of potential demands by targets; and (3) collective action
problems reduce the likelihood of target action.
1. Lack of Credibility or Means
Targets, when deciding whether to make demands upon indicator
generators for improved accuracy or accountability, almost certainly
take into account the chances that their demands will be heeded. Since
the making of demands may be costly in terms of time, human capital,
and deflection of lobbying resources from other activities, targets may
avoid lodging such demands even if they have a strong interest in
ensuring that indicators are accurate, or in influencing the way these
indicators are set. We can identify a few factors that might discourage
targets from engaging in demands.
To begin, those who use indicators to judge the quality of
governance in a country likely do so in part because the indicators are
generated by ostensibly impartial observers, in contrast to data supplied
either by the users' own governments or the businesses and
governments of target countries. Consequently, indicator generators will
be reluctant to heed the demands of targets for fear of the damage such
interactions may cause to their reputations. Unless targets can marshal
truly compelling evidence to suggest that an indicator is flawed,
indicator generators should be inclined to ignore them-especially if the
targets represent countries that have reputations for oppression and
secrecy.
Target countries also may lack the means to contact and persuade
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generators to change the way they develop indicators. Countries with
insufficiently developed information management systems will be at a
disadvantage in gathering and presenting data that challenges
conclusions drawn by an indicator generator. Moreover, the education
levels of the country's elite, and the sources of education, will play a
critical role in determining whether attempts to persuade indicator
generators to change their operations will be successful. If a country has
few persons that have been educated abroad, and that are employed in
prominent universities, international companies, or development
agencies, it will be hard for that country to open channels of
communication with indicator generators. Finally, any lobbying effort
requires resources-to fund research, travel, the retention of
intermediaries, and so on. Thus, less wealthy countries will be less able
to engage in the persuasion involved in lodging effective demands.
2. Inability to Marshal Credible Threats of Exit
The likelihood that demands for enhanced accuracy or accountability
will be successful is affected not only by the credibility and means of
indicator targets, but by their capacity to marshal credible threats of exit
from the indicator-target relationship. This relationship between exit
and voice is detailed by Albert 0. Hirschman in Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations,and States.20 3
Hirschman's model does not have auspicious implications for the
success of demands made by targets upon indicator generators, which
suggests in turn that targets should be reluctant to expend the resources
needed to make these demands.
Hirschman explains that when an organization fails to meet
performance expectations, customers or members have two routes
through which they can alert management as to its failings: the exit
option, in which "[s]ome customers stop buying the firm's products or
some members leave the organization," and the voice option, whereby
"[tihe firm's customers or the organization's members express their
dissatisfaction

directly

to management

. . . or

through

general

protest." 204

When faced with alternative B to current choice A, a
customer or member will resort to the more costly voice option rather
than exit if "A's original margin of superiority over B was wide enough
to make it worthwhile for him to forego a B that is superior right here
and now" in the hopes that voice will lead A to regain its original
quality. 20 5 Thus, viewing opportunities for exit as proportional to the
203. See ALBERT 0. HIRscHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (Harvard U. Press 1970).

204. Id. at 4.
205. Id. at 38-39.
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quality of B, "the role of voice would increase as the opportunities for
exit decline, up to the point where, with exit wholly unavailable, voice
must carry the entire burden of alerting management to its failings." 206
If exit is easy-if B is equivalent to A-then customers or members are
unlikely to expend the effort that voice requires. However, given that
"[o]ne important way of bringing influence to bear on an organization is
to threaten exit," "voice is not only handicapped when exit is possible,
but also, though in a quite different way, when it is not." 207 We can
therefore "spell out the conditions under which voice (a) will be
resorted to and (b) bids fair to be effective: there should be the
possibility of exit, but exit should not be too easy or too attractive as
soon as deterioration of one's own organization sets in." 208
But how can Hirschman's concept of "exit" be of use in analyzing
the behavior of indicator targets? Unlike indicator users, the targets of
indicators cannot simply choose to stop being measured; at best, it
seems, they could refuse to cooperate with the generators of institutions,
denying researchers visas and declining to respond to any requests for
information. But if targets are motivated by the desire to influence how
indicators are set, such measures seem unlikely to accomplish the given
aims.
Indicator targets do have another alternative available to them,
though-they can attempt to induce the users of indicators to stop using
indicators to evaluate the target, so that the target would have
effectively "exited" from its status as an object of measurement. Of
course, the measurement and indicating activities would continue, but
their significance for the target would be decreased. Targets can
accomplish this effective exit in a few ways-by pointing out to users
the inadequacies of certain indicators, by supporting the use of
alternative indicators, or by providing users with supplementary
information and analysis that make indicators less useful and hence less
likely to be employed. To the extent that generators rely upon users to
supply them with revenues, reputation, or influence, the prospect of
effective exit by targets and its concomitant, actual exit by users, should
frighten generators into taking targets seriously.
How successful is this threat of "effective exit" likely to be in
backstopping demands made upon generators by targets? The first two
methods described above have the potential to backfire upon targets
because of the credibility problem already described in the preceding
section. Complaints from a target perceived to be corrupt or repressive
about a given indicator may actually bolster its reputation for accuracy;
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 34.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 83.
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efforts by such targets to induce users to switch from one indicator to
another might foster perceptions that the favored indicators are not
impartial and accurate, but actually in thrall to the targets. The first two
approaches also include many of the disadvantages that characterize the
"'voice" option and the absence of which usually makes the "exit"
option attractive. Convincing users to stop using a given indicator, or to
switch to another indicator, represents a public good for all targets
dissatisfied with the given indicator, and hence gives rise to the
collective action problems that we will consider in the following
section. Moreover, the process of persuading users to change their
behavior is a costly one, particularly if such users have publicly
committed to rely on a given set of indicators. Thus, the MCC cannot
simply choose to abandon the WGIs or the Freedom in the World
ratings because some indicator targets prevail upon them to do so; many
potential candidates for aid have relied upon the MCC's commitments
to use these indicators in creating their own development strategies, and
the MCC cannot simply switch procedures abruptly. Finally, users of
indicators will often not have the patience to consider supplementary
information required by the third approach, and may not be willing to
credit this information even if they are willing to consider it. In
particular, the MCC, journalists, academics, and investors likely use
indicators mostly because their quantitative nature provides such users
with the uniform, "synotic" view already discussed with reference to
James C. Scott's work. It is unlikely that the provision to such users
of detailed information of variable scope and quality will be welcomed.
The powerlessness of targets to exit from their relationship with
indicator generators, even in an "effective" sense, makes their demands
far less powerful. Unless targets, especially in the form of government
agencies or civil society groups, derive some benefit from the act of
criticizing indicators itself, targets should tend to concentrate their
persuasive capital on other, more promising endeavors.
3. Barriers to Collective Action
In 1965, Mancur Olson published The Logic of Collective Action:
Public Goods and the Theory of Groups,21 0 seeking to explain when
"groups of individuals with common interests" will "attempt to further
those common interests."2 1' While Olson frequently refers to
"organizations," his work is equally applicable to any groups sharing a
common interest, so that it can help explain when targets will act to
209.

See supra Part II.D.2.a, discussion.

210.

MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY

OF GROUPS (Harvard U. Press 1971).

211.

Id. at 1.
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secure enhanced accountability from indicator generators. Generally
speaking, such action seems unlikely.
According to Olson, "[t]he individual member of the typical large
organization" occupies a position in which "his own efforts will not
have a noticeable effect on the situation of his organization, and he can
enjoy any improvements brought about by others whether or not he has
worked ... "212 Consequently, large organizations will not be able to
"support themselves without providing some sanction, or some
attraction distinct from the public good itself, that will lead individuals
,,211
On the
to help bear the burdens of maintaining the organization.
other hand, "in some small groups each of the members, or at least one
of them, will find that his personal gain from having the collective good
exceeds the total cost of providing some amount of that collective good
214 Such "larger" members have an incentive to pay the cost of
....
providing for some amount of the collective good, even if they must do
so alone. Thus, while even in the smallest groups "the collective good
will not ordinarily be provided on an optimal scale," we should expect
that "the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of providing an
optimal amount of a collective good." 215 Moreover, "[i]n small groups
with common interests there is . . . a surprising tendency for the
'exploitation' of the greatby the small."216
It is not immediately evident that enhanced accuracy or
accountability represents a public good for indicator targets, however,
so that Olson's model need not necessarily apply here. After all, a target
country could conceivably intervene to change accuracy or
accountability with respect to its indicators alone, through the direct
provision of supplementary information or efforts to secure more
accountable indicator-generating processes. But information provision
is made possible only by high levels of participation and review, and as
explained, high levels of these accountability components are really
only rendered meaningful if they are accompanied by transparency,
reason-giving, and legality, as well. One way or another, a target will
thus have to push for greater accountability if it wants to influence how
indicators are set.
An indicator generator might conceivably respond to lobbying for
increased accountability by providing such enhanced accountability
only to the target doing the lobbying, just as I surmised above that
generators may sometimes provide selectively elevated accountability to
some users. If generators prize their reputation for independence and
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Id. at 16.
Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 34-35 (emphasis removed).
Id. at 35 (emphasis in the original).
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impartiality, though, engaging in such apparent collusion with only
some indicator targets will be to their significant detriment. Thus,
efforts by targets to secure more accountable indicator-generating
processes should, when it succeeds, more usually result in broad
changes by the generator than in changes that affect only the particular
indicator that the target country demander has in mind. As a
consequence, from the perspective of targets, we are dealing here with a
public good.
Based on Olson's model, then, we should anticipate that when
indicator targets have the capacity individually to secure enhanced
accuracy or accountability with respect to the indicators that affect
them, and when the welfare of these actors is significantly affected by
decisions made based on indicators, demands for accuracy or
accountability should become more likely. It is less probable that this
capacity threshold will be crossed for a large group of "small" targets
than for a small group of "large" targets, though if a large group
includes some "large" actors we might still see such demands.
How might we characterize the number, interests, and "size" of
governance indicator targets? For all three of the indicators considered
here, the number of targets should be large. The ICRGs include political
risk ratings for 140 countries, Freedom House evaluates over 200
countries and territories in its Freedom in the World ratings, and the
MAR project codes variables on ethnopolitical groups in nearly 120
countries. If each country that is the object of indication is viewed not
monolithically as a single target, but as composed of businesses, civil
society groups, government agencies, and ethnic groups, each with a
potential interest in how the indicators are set, the number of target
actors for each indicator becomes quite large indeed.
Each indicator will likely be characterized by a different level of
target interest in how the indicator is set. It is hard to imagine that
targets are excessively exercised about the levels of the MAR variables,
given the almost exclusive use of these variables in academic
scholarship that affects the welfare of targets in extremely indirect
fashion, at best. But the governments, business interests, and civil
society of indicated countries should all have a strong interest in the
ICRGs if the ratings are actually used to make investment decisions,
even if they are only employed as a check against internal analyses; the
lack of transparency regarding exactly how these ratings are used by
investors might actually increase target interest in how they are set. The
ICRGs' inclusion in the WGIs that furnish several of the criteria for the
MCC should bolster target interest in indicator levels, especially on the
part of government actors within the target countries. However, it
should be noted that country targets with larger economies might be less
interested in ICRG levels than small-economy targets. For particularly
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important investment destinations, it seems likely that investors will
rely much less on political risk ratings and much more on their own
analyses, displaying the hedging behavior already described. Moreover,
the several-hundred-million-dollar development grants through the
MCC are likely to make up only a negligible part of the budgets of
large-economy countries.
The Freedom House ratings present a somewhat similar picture. The
main uses of the ratings are in academia, MCC funding, and journalism.
Targets are likely to be little interested in the first use. The second use
mirrors that of the ICRGs, except that the Freedom in the World ratings
are arguably more decisive in determining MCC allocations than the
Risk Guides, since the Freedom House ratings are not aggregated with
other indicators to furnish a single criterion and Freedom House ratings
tend to be clustered around the median score, which is the cut-off for
country candidate eligibility. However, large-economy countries should
be much less interested in the role Freedom House ratings play in
determining MCC funding than small-economy countries. The same
cannot necessarily be said of the journalistic uses of the Freedom in the
World ratings; even if journalism does not influence investment
decisions or aid allocations in a determinate manner, it does affect a
country's reputation and geopolitical clout, and the membership of its
rulers in the fraternity of world leaders. Large countries should be as
interested in these goods as small countries. However, journalistic
coverage of larger countries that incorporates the Freedom House
ratings is more likely to be diluted by a mass of other coverage, which
should reduce the ratings' importance. Generally speaking, then, the
same large-economy and small-economy gap in interest that we
anticipated in the ICRG case should appear with respect to the Freedom
House ratings.
Finally, we must evaluate the "size" of governance indicator targets.
Some target countries are wealthier or represent larger economies. They
should thus have more resources to draw on in lobbying efforts, so that
if capacity to bring about changes in accuracy or accountability levels in
indicators depends on the resources available for lobbying, several
targets will be substantially "larger" than the rest. However, it is
possible that there are enough countries with large economies and
significant resources at their disposal that they might free ride on each
other's efforts to improve accuracy and accountability. Thus, if there are
a large number of "large" targets, none of the targets may end up taking
action. On the other hand, to the extent that targets view themselves as
not necessarily sharing the same aims, the group of targets may
subdivide into blocs--developing countries, African countries,
commodity-producing countries-within which only a few large actors
might be found. This would reduce the likelihood of free-riding.
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Taking all this together, what are the prospects for action by targets
to secure the public goods of enhanced accountability in indicator
generation? Even if the group of targets subdivides into blocs, the
number of actors within each bloc will be large. However, many of the
actors will have significant interests in influencing how some indicators
are set, given the importance of the ICRGs and Freedom in the World
ratings in shaping investment and development decisions, and within
each bloc there should only be a few well-resourced, "large" actors.
This might seem to indicate the target action should be favored.
However, a serious dilemma faces target countries seeking to influence
indicator generation: those countries with the greatest capacity to
prevail upon the indicator generators to change the way that they set
indicators will also be the countries with the least interest in ICRG
accuracy. After all, the wealthiest countries with the largest economies
will (1) probably be independently analyzed by investors without much
reference to relatively simple indicators like the Risk Guides, (2)
depend little on the comparatively small sums of money offered by the
MCC, and (3) be the subjects of a great deal of journalistic coverage,
entirely apart from that which relies on Freedom House ratings. The
countries that have the most to lose from unfavorable indicators will
also be the countries least capable of convincing the generators to
change their ways.
Altogether, then, we should expect few demands from indicator
targets upon generators for improved accuracy or accountability, even if
some targets have a strong interest in the levels at which these
indicators are set. A lack of credibility and means to make demands, the
absence of the credible threats of exit needed to give force to demands,
and collective action problems should all push targets toward silence.
C. IndicatorGeneratorReluctance to Bolster Accountability
If users are unlikely to make demands for enhanced accuracy
because they will often lack the interest, and if targets are unlikely to
make such demands because they will usually lack the capacity, another
factor complicates the hypothesized relationship between demands and
accountability: even when demands for accuracy are made upon
generators, the generators may not respond by boosting accountability.
In our exposition of the Demand Hypothesis, we postulated that because
improved accountability has a unique potential to bolster accuracy and
stave off future demands, generators should respond to demands for
accuracy by increasing accountability. However, it is actually just as
likely that bolstering accountability will tend to intensify, not diminish,
demands by outsiders. Because the effects of increased accountability
are difficult to pin down, indicator generators may choose to respond to
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demands for accuracy by implementing changes in the ways indicators
are generated, without bringing outsiders into this process.
On the one hand, ratcheting up accountability seems likely to
mitigate external demands upon an indicator generator. After all,
providing increased opportunities for participation and review should
decrease other demands for improved accuracy, since outsiders will
usually prefer to make use of institutionalized channels for making
demands. Indicator generators might prefer such an arrangement not
only because it lessens the probability that demands will be publicly
expressed and hence discredit the indicator, but also because having
mechanisms for dealing with these demands reduces their potential to
distract the entire organization from the task of indicator generation.
However, increasing the scope for participation and review also has the
potential to markedly increase the volume of demands flowing through
the established channels; reducing the cost of making demands should
tend to increase their frequency. Moreover, once outsiders have been
granted an entitlement to get involved in the generation of indicators,
perceptions that participation is not full enough, or that review is not
truly impartial or effective, may lead to amplified complaints made
outside of these channels. Total exclusion from decision-making can
actually be an extremely effective way of discouraging outsiders from
attempting to exercise oversight over decisions.
The other accountability components-transparency, reason-giving,
and legality-may all tend to increase the stridency of criticisms made
of indicator generators, as well. The more outsiders know about how
indicators are created, the more likely they are to find fault with these
processes. The greater the extent to which generators commit to rules
that govern how they develop indicators, the more outsiders can point to
procedural shortcomings in order to protest the levels at which
indicators are set. In the following section, we will see some reasons
why indicator generators, despite these risks, might nonetheless choose
to increase levels of transparency, reason-giving, and legality. However,
it certainly seems unlikely that such improvements in accountability
will result merely from demands by outsiders for greater accuracy or
accountability, and generators might even prefer to avoid increases in
participation and review, given their uncertain effects.

VIII. THE

SUPPLY HYPOTHESIS

The Demand Hypothesis is likely incorrect in presuming that users
and targets will attempt to secure enhanced accountability from
indicator generators and that indicators will be eager to furnish such
accountability. Nonetheless, we should still expect users, when deciding

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

55

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [2010], Art. 3

456

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22

which indicator to employ, to seek out the most accurate indicator. Once
an indicator has been chosen, some users may be limited in their
capacity to exit to alternative indicators; development agencies like the
MCC may have publicly committed to use the indicator in allocating
funds, and investors may have built decision-making structures that
have a certain indicator, with its idiosyncratic features, at their heart.
When a user is still deciding which indicator to employ, it is likely to be
drawn to indicators that appear more accurate, all else being equal. This
expectation about user behavior forms the foundation of the Supply
Hypothesis.
Users will often be handicapped in directly evaluating the accuracy
of an indicator. Just as legislators, in attempting to exercise oversight
over development agencies, will usually have difficulty identifying
whether development outcomes are a consequence of poor funding
allocation on the part of the agencies, indicator users will often be hardpressed to tell whether an indicator correctly measures the phenomena it
is supposed to reflect, or whether the results of their own investment or
development decisions are a consequence of inaccuracy in the indicators
used or other factors. Users tend to judge indicator accuracy not by
looking at the indicators themselves, but by looking for markers that
tend to accompany accurate measures. That is, users will usually judge
accuracy by evaluating the processes generators use to develop
indicators.
If an indicator generator wants to attract as many users as possible,
then, the generator should provide those types of accountability that
tend to further the task of convincing potential users that its indicator
has the marks of accuracy. In particular, generators should provide
heightened levels of transparency and reason-giving when they seek to
persuade users to employ their indicators, so that users may be
impressed by the thoroughness of indicator-generating processes and
the validity of the generator's indicator-setting approach. Under this
Supply Hypothesis, then, high levels of accountability result not from
demands by users or targets, but from competition by indicators to
secure the patronage of users. Consequently, the more consultative
facets of accountability-participation and review-will tend to be
under-provided. Moreover, indicator generators will tend to provide
greater transparency and reason-giving when potential users could
easily do without a particular indicator, and when the use of that
indicator by a user will tend to confer a substantial benefit-whether in
the form of revenues or influence-upon the indicator generator.
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IX. EVALUATING THE SUPPLY HYPOTHESIS
Just as with the Demand Hypothesis, we can evaluate the Supply
Hypothesis by seeing what predictions it makes about our test case
indicators, and comparing those predictions to the levels of
accountability we observe. To begin, we should attempt to ascertain the
returns each indicator generator derives from the patronage of its users,
and the competitiveness of the environment in which each indicator
exists.
A. The User-Dependenceand Competitiveness of the Generators
1. International Country Risk Guides
The PRS Group depends on revenue from the sale of licenses to its
products.217 Because the main purchasers of these licenses are private
investors, the Group can be said to rely substantially on its relationship
with these investors; if investors stop using the ICRGs in their decisionmaking, PRS Group revenues will suffer. The Group also charges
academics for the use of the ICRGs, deriving financial benefit from this
use.
In contrast, a decision by the MCC to stop using the ICRGs (or the
WGIs in which they are incorporated) would not directly affect the
Group's bottom line, since the MCC's use of the ICRGs does not lead
directly to increased revenues for the Group. But academics and the
MCC both confer another sort of benefit upon the PRS Group; when
they choose to use the ICRGs in their analyses or decision-making, this
results in a higher profile for the Risk Guides and a greater reputation
for reliability, both of which should allow the Group to charge higher
rates and to sell more licenses to use the Guides. Thus, the PRS Group's
dependence on all of its users is significant.
Alternatives to the ICRGs are certainly available, moreover. Many
governance indicators exist; Marie Besangon of the World Peace
Foundation lists almost fifty.2 18 Some of these indicators measure only
particular aspects of governance (such as Transparency International's
Corruption Perceptions Index 2 19 ) or cover only particular regions (such
as Asian Barometer 220 ), while others are more comprehensive. There is
at least one other privately produced political risk indicator-the
Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) ratings 22 '-and several
217.
218.

The PRS Group, supra note 94.
Besangon, supra note 14, at 11-34.

219.

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 18.

220.
221.

Asian Barometer, supra note 33.
Business Environment Risk Intelligence, supra note 34.
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other indicators measure the quality of the business environment.222 For
either development agency or international investor users of ICRGs,
internal analysis of governance and political risk is always an option; as
discussed, the World Bank uses internal assessments rather than the
WGIs published by their own World Bank Institute to guide their
Performance Based Allocation of funds, 22 3 and many investors base
decisions mostly on their own assessments, using commercial risk
services like the ICRGs only in supplementary fashion. 2 24 Thus, private
investors, academics, and development agencies have other governance
measures that they could choose in case the ICRGs appear insufficiently
attractive.
2. Freedom in the World Rankings
In contrast to the PRS Group, Freedom House is not an organization
that depends directly upon any of its users for financial support, because
it is primarily supported by grants from "various private foundations
Given that the U.S. government supplies
and government agencies.
75% of the Freedom House budget,226 it might be true that the
organization would see its funding affected if its ratings proved to be of
little use to U.S. development agencies like the MCC. However, given
that Freedom House was receiving U.S. funding for many years before
the MCC started using its ratings to guide funding allocation, and given
the reasons we have already elucidated for questioning the interest of
officials in aid efficacy, this connection seems tenuous and unlikely. On
the other hand, though, Freedom House is an advocacy NGO that likely
measures its success, and justifies its existence to funders, in part based
on how influential its ratings are. Consequently, decisions by
journalists, academics, or development agencies to use other indicators
as measures of good governance would certainly injure the
organization's interests, both financially and in a more existential sense.
As with the ICRGs, moreover, Freedom House does have many
competitors in the field of governance indicators, though some of these
indicators may not measure the same precise phenomena as Freedom
House, cover the same broad range of countries, extend as far back in
history, or possess Freedom House's high profile. Thus, some users may
222. See, e.g., supra Part II.B, discussion.
223. See id.
224. See supra VII.A. 1, discussion.
225. Freedom House, About Us, http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=2 (last
visited Oct. 19, 2010).
226.

See FREEDOM HOUSE, 2005 FREEDoM HOUSE ANNUAL REPORT 24 (stating that of

$26.8 million in total revenues and support received in Fiscal Year 2005, $20.2 million came
from federal grants), availableat http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/special-report/ 41.pdf.
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default to use of Freedom House's ratings even in the absence of
transparency or reason-giving that helps persuade them that the ratings
are reliable, basing their choice not on probable accuracy but on
reputation or the need for extensive data. I will return to this point in a
moment, when we consider the defects of the Supply Hypothesis.
3. Minorities at Risk Variables
Finally, the MAR Project does not derive financial support from its
users; the MAR variables are free.227 On the other hand, though, the
users of the MAR indicators may provide much in the way of influence,
visibility, and usefulness to the indicators, the quest for which
presumably supplies at least some of the motivation for the indicators'
generators. Another important aim of the MAR Project, though, might
be simply to expand the amount of available knowledge about
ethnopolitical groups, with only limited concern about how this
knowledge is used.
The funders whose grants make the MAR
Project's activities possible may share this predominant interest in
generating new knowledge for knowledge's sake. We might expect,
then, that the MAR Project will be less concerned with expanding its
field of users than the PRS Group or Freedom House. As for levels of
competition, the MAR Project is quite unique in studying and coding
the mobilization and treatment of ethnic and political groups;
researchers interested in studying these issues have few alternatives to
which they can turn.
B. ComparingPredictionsto Observations
We would predict, on the basis of this analysis, that the PRS Group
should have the highest levels of transparency and reason-giving, while
Freedom House would have perhaps slightly lower levels, and the MAR
Project the lowest levels of all. Levels of participation and review
should be low throughout all the cases.
What do we see in reality? The PRS Group does provide some levels
of transparency in explaining its methodology, though it provides little
insight about the analysts who develop ratings and about the
information these analysts use. Reports that explain the ICRGs are
provided for twenty to twenty-five of the most important countries that
are rated, but there is very little scope for participation or review in
227. See MAR, Data, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/data.asp (offering free downloads of
qualitative and quantitative data).
228. It is certainly beyond dispute that many academics are more interested in the
hypothetical usefulness of their work than the actual usefulness, if they are interested in
usefulness at all.
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ICRG generation. Freedom House is much more transparent, explaining
in detail how its ratings are produced, who participates in this process,
and what sources of information are used. Freedom House also provides
detailed justificatory reports about every one of the countries and
territories that it rates. From its documentation, it is possible to infer
that Freedom House also provides some limited opportunity for
participation-listing among its sources of information NGOs, think
tanks, professional contacts, and visits to the region-and review,
though there is no review by neutral arbiters upon the request of outside
parties. As for the MAR Project, it is somewhat lacking in transparency,
with only limited information available about its ratings methodology,
and reason-giving, with reasons given only for a subset of its variables.
The Project, like Freedom House, provides no external review, though it
does provide a great deal of scope for participation by making the
contact information of its staff available, by soliciting feedback from
users, and by working with users at academic conferences to improve its
methodology.
In the main, then, the predictions of the Supply Hypothesis are borne
out by reality. The PRS Group and Freedom House both provide
significant transparency and reason-giving and the MAR Project does
not, though in contrast to predictions, Freedom House actually surpasses
the PRS Group in the supply of these components. Neither the PRS
Group nor Freedom House offers much room for participation or
review, though the MAR Project does provide for substantial
participation. The Supply Hypothesis, then, cannot be said to represent
the whole story of accountability in indicator generation, but it seems to
have some explanatory power. By considering where this Hypothesis
might fall short, we can construct a more complete explanation.
X. EXPLAINING THE FAILURES OF THE SUPPLY HYPOTHESIS
A. The Role ofReputation
Transparency and reason-giving are not the only tools available to a
generator seeking to entice potential users. The accuracy and reliability
of an indicator may be ascertained from the methodology by which it is
set and the reasons given to justify indicator levels, but these qualities
may also be judged by reference to the indicator's reputation. If an
indicator is widely used and little criticized, then would-be users can be
more confident that it is reliable, and the indicator generator will have to
expend less energy convincing users of this fact through enhanced
transparency and reason-giving. If an indicator is obscure, or wellknown but frequently pilloried, then generators may have to work more
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to convey the impression of reliability.
The role of reputation in bolstering perceptions of accuracy may
explain why the ICRGs are supported by less transparency and reasongiving than the Freedom in the World ratings, even though the Supply
Hypothesis would predict otherwise. The Freedom House ratings, while
extremely well-known, are also often subject to charges from journalists
and academics that they display a right-wing bias and are heavily
influenced by the political aims of the U.S. government.2 29 The ICRGs,
though widely used, are much more rarely the object of any critical
coverage. The PRS Group may be more secure relying on its reputation
to attract users than Freedom House, then.
B. Identity andParticipation
The Supply Hypothesis predicts that generators will not make
provision for participation or review in order to "sell" their indicators to
prospective users. In our discussion of the defects in the Demand
Hypothesis, moreover, I reasoned that generators should be disinclined
to furnish high levels of participation or review under most
circumstances, because ratcheting up levels of these accountability
components tends only to prompt more demands and criticisms from
outsiders. These two propositions still leave room for generators to
allow participation and review under some circumstances, though.
When generators are motivated not primarily by the need to persuade
possible users to rely on their indicators, when it is not too costly to
bring a class of outsiders into the indicator development process, and
when the outsider-generator relationship is marked by a certain level of
trust, generators may increase the levels of participation and review that
are available exclusively to that class of outsiders. In short, when
indicator generators and a certain type of outside actor share an attribute
that frequently brings them into contact, provision of participation and
review should rise.
The best example of this principle from our case studies arises in the
context of the MAR Project. Participation by users in that case seems to
have been enabled by the fact that MAR users and indicator generators
shared a profession, so that they interacted at professional conferences
and felt comfortable exchanging information on indicator reliability.
The MAR Project did not have to worry about demands from their
229. See, e.g., Right Web, Freedom House, http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1476.
html (last visited Oct. 19, 2010) ("[w]hile touting itself as having a 'bipartisan character,'
Freedom House is often associated with hawkish and neoconservative factions within both
major U.S. parties, a fact made clear by many of its current and past supporters and board
members."); Bollen, supra note 7, at 205 (noting that "researchers claim that [Freedom House's]
conservative slant has led to incorrect rights and liberties ratings for some countries").
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academic users spiraling out of control, because the generator-user
relationship was likely marked by collegiality and civility. The Project
also did not have to invest many resources in setting up channels of
participation, and the problems of credibility and means that likely
afflict indicator targets in their efforts to communicate with generators
would not have been present, either. In fact, shared identity can explain
more in the MAR context than just the observed levels of participation.
The shared profession of indicator generators and users may also
explain whatever transparency deficits are observed here, and the
absence of formal review; when academic users of the MAR indicators
need additional information about how variables are coded, they likely
can simply contact the Project administrators for additional information,
and they may be able to question the levels at which indicators have
been set through similar informal channels, without the need for
recourse to an external, independent arbitrator.
When we first considered the possibility that generators may
selectively extend higher levels of accountability to some users, in the
context of the Freedom House ratings, I suggested that this prospect
raised concerns about legality that may outweigh any other
accountability benefits that might result. Should we feel any differently
about the selective provision of accountability to the MAR users? I
would argue that we should, for two reasons. Selectively elevated levels
of accountability may appear unfair, but they do not undermine legality
as much as secretively elevated levels-as long as it is evident that
some actors have more access to the indicator development process,
other actors can adjust their demands and expectations accordingly.
Even if the MAR Project does furnish its users with expanded
accountability in some non-transparent, irregular ways, it matters
whether this apparent secretiveness is the result of an intent to conceal
demands and complaints being made, or whether it is merely a function
of the fact that few outside the community of users really care about the
indicator. If the only real audience for an indicator is its users, and these
users share an identity with the indicator generator and hence enjoy
higher levels of accountability, the overall accountability profile of the
indicator should not be considered to be injured. The generator is still
providing for voice and choice by those who would exercise it.
C. The ProfessionalEthic
Finally, readers may have already remarked to themselves on the
bloodlessness of the Demand and Supply Hypotheses and their
accompanying commentary. Humans do not act only when others
compel them to do so by their demands, or when it is easy to do so. In
our discussion so far, little mention has so far been made of the
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professionals who work at indicator-generating institutions themselves.
It seems possible, though, that the most powerful determinant of how
much accountability is furnished by a generator is not the
competitiveness of the environment facing the generator, its dependence
on its users, or even the commonality of identity between generator and
user, but rather the organizational ethos that characterizes the generator.
Open, consultative organizations with intrinsically motivated staff may
have such an interest in producing high-quality indicators that they
provide high levels of transparency, participation, reason-giving,
review, and legality of their own volition, conscious that such openness
will tend to foster greater accuracy.
This is certainly an important possibility. Two brief comments
should be made regarding it, however. First, it would be exceedingly
difficult to incorporate "openness" or "sincerity" into a model of how
accountability levels in indicator generation are determined. Unless
crude characterizations were employed-for-profit companies are
insincere, NGOs are open, multilateral institutions are bureaucratic, and
so on-evaluations of how open or sincere a generator is will inevitably
depend largely on observed levels of accountability, which is the
phenomenon we are trying to explain. Trying to base a model on
sincerity thus risks allowing such a variable to spread to explain all the
observed variation, making the effort to develop a model an essentially
useless exercise. Secondly, it is not clear that sincerity plays as large a
role as its proponents might claim. After all, none of the indicator
generators analyzed here provide significant levels of review, which
would be predicted by the Supply Hypothesis but not by an emphasis on
sincerity, unless it be assumed that every generator considered here is
marked by a lack of commitment to indicator accuracy. When an
organization is trying to do the best it can to improve its influence or
revenues in light of competition and scarce resources, sincerity may
actually have very little to do with final levels of accountability; it may
simply be squeezed out by other considerations.
XI. CONCLUSION

In this Article, I have sought to explain how levels of accountability
in indicator generation are determined. I began with a hypothesis that,
while intuitively appealing, proved not to explain observed levels of
accountability in our three test cases: that when the stakes of decisions
made based on governance indicators are high, targets and users of
these indicators will demand enhanced accuracy and accountability
from generators, which will lead these generators to provide higher
levels of accountability. The Demand Hypothesis appeared to fail for a
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few reasons. First, even when users make high-stakes decisions based
on indicators, they may nonetheless not display serious levels of interest
in the accuracy of these indicators. Second, even when targets should be
interested in the levels at which indicators are set, they may not have the
capacity to act to secure this public good. Finally, even if demands for
accuracy or accountability are made by users and targets, generators
should still often have good reason to respond to these demands not by
improving accountability but by tinkering with their methodologies.
Having lost faith in the Demand Hypothesis, we turned to an
alternative: the Supply Hypothesis. I postulated that indicator generators
may provide higher accountability levels not because they are
demanded by users or targets, but because certain types of
accountability help to "sell" indicators to potential users. This
Hypothesis encountered greater success when brought into contact with
reality, though it still needed to be modified by certain provisos. Rather
than levels of competition between indicators and indicator dependence
on users determining all of the observed variation in accountability, a
role likely needed to be left for reputation and identity.
What are we left with, then? Indicator generators should display
higher levels of transparency and reason-giving when they are in
competition with other indicators, or when users can do without
indicators altogether, and when the users provide the generators with
significant revenue or influence. However, these levels should be
moderated when a generator has already established a reputation for
reliability. High levels of participation and review should generally not
be observed in indicator generation, though these accountability
components might be furnished when generators and users (or,
conceivably, targets or any other kinds of actors) share an identity
attribute that decreases the costs of furnishing such accountability for
both types of actors.
Why is this interesting? The study of governance indicator
generation actually does have implications for other global
administrative law bodies. The decisive failure of the Demand
Hypothesis indicates that we should not expect high levels of
accountability to result just because a GAL body engages in
consequential behavior; collective action problems, an inability to
marshal a credible threat of exit, and the capacity to hedge or duck
responsibility on the part of actors affected by the behavior may
nonetheless mean that accountability levels remain low. When a GAL
body needs to secure compliance or cooperation from other actors, we
should expect levels of transparency and reason-giving to be higher, so
as to support the persuasive activities of the body. But participation and
review should usually be low unless the GAL body administrators and
other actors share a community or identity that makes provision of these
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accountability components more low-cost and less likely to spiral out of
control.
Or, at least, one can hypothesize that these relationships and trends
hold true in the larger GAL context. The real test, of course, should lie
in comparison with reality.
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